[ BOURINOT] A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 23 
tion than a more democratic lower house elected on a short term of three 
years—one more than the house of representatives of congress, and two 
less than the house of commons of Canada. Of course, some of the Aus- 
tralian colonies have had experience of an elective upper house, and it is 
somewhat curious that while they continue that system in the proposed 
federal union, the Canadians have returned to an appointed house as pre- 
ferable to the one they had before 1867—even so thorough a radical as 
the late George Brown, then leader of the Liberal party, earnestly urged 
the change in the Quebec convention, When we consider the character 
of the agitation against upper houses, we see that, in the nature of things, 
democracy is ever striving to remove what it considers barriers in the 
way of its powers and will. An upper house, under modern political 
conditions, is likely to be unpopular with the radical and socialistic 
elements of society, unless it is elective. As the Australians are obviously 
admirers of the American federal constitution, from which they copy 
the constitution of their upper chamber, we direct their attention to the 
fact that an agitation has already commenced and made much headway 
in the United States, to change the present indirect method of electing 
senators, and to give their election directly to the people. It says some- 
thing, however, for the conservative and English instincts of the Aus- 
tralians that they have not yielded to the full demands of democracy, 
but have recognized the necessity of an upper house in any safe system 
of parliamentary government. 
V DLT: 
We see accordingly in the dominion and provincial constitutions the 
leading principles of the English system—a permanent executive, re- 
sponsible ministers, and a parliament or legislature. The central govern- 
ment follows directly the English model by continuing the upper 
house, but the majority of the provinces vary from all other countries of 
English institutions by abolishing the legislative councils. In the enum- 
eration of the legislative powers respectively given to the dominion and 
provincial legislatures, an effort was made to avoid the conflicts of juris- 
diction that so frequently arose between the national and state govern- 
ments of the federal republic. In the first place we have a recapitulation 
of those general or national powers that properly belong to a central 
authority, such as customs and excise duties, regulation of trade and 
commerce, militia and defence, post office, banking and coinage, railways 
and public works “ for the general advantage,” navigation and shipping, 
naturalization and aliens, coast service, fisheries, weights and measures, 
marriage and divorce, penitentiaries, criminal law, census and statistics. 
On the other hand, the provinces have retained control over municipal 
institutions, public lands, local works and undertakings, incorporation 
