[BOURINOT] A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 31 
stitutional authority, the veto continues to be exercised with much con- 
venience to all the parties interested. It must be admitted that on the 
whole the authorities of the Dominion have exercised this sovereign 
power with discretion, but it cannot be denied that it may be at any time 
a dangerous weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous and reckless central 
administration when in direct antagonism to a provincial government, and 
it can hardly be considered one of the elements of strength, but rather 
a latent source of weakness in the federal structure. 
xe 
No doubt the experience of the Canadians in the exercise of the 
veto power has convinced the promoters of the proposed federal union of 
Australia that it would be unwise to incorporate it in their draft of con- 
stitution, which simply provides that “when a law of a state is inconsist- 
ent with a law of the commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the 
former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.” The political 
government of the federation is given no special authority to act under 
this clause and declare any “state” legislation unconstitutional by a pro- 
clamation of the governor-general, as is done in Canada, but the provision 
must be simply a direction to the courts, which also in the proposed 
commonwealth are to have all the legitimate authority that is essential 
to the satisfactory operation of a federal system. 
The only power of veto expressly given to the commonwealth is that 
of annulling any law or regulation made by any state, or by any authority 
constituted by any state, having the eftect of derogating from freedom 
of trade or commerce between the different parts of the commonwealth. 
Asa matter of fact, any such state law would be decided unconstitutional, 
since the regulation of trade and commerce is within the exclusive juris- 
diction of the general government of the commonwealth, and consequently 
the provision in question only states the law more emphatically, and 
seems in a sense almost Supererogatory. 
Some of the members of the Australian convention, however. have 
seen a means of controlling “state” legislation in the following provision : 
“5. All references or communications required by the constitution of 
any state or otherwise to be made by the governor to the queen shall be 
made through the governor-general, as her majesty’s representative in 
the commonwealth, and the queen’s pleasure shall be known through 
him.” 
This section was severely criticized by the advocates of “State 
Rights” in the convention, but it is certainly necessary, unless we are to 
see the strange spectacle presented at all times of the general and state 
governments communicating separately with the imperial authorities, 
who would soon become thoroughly perplexed, while the federation 
