[BRYMNER] THE JAMAICA MAROONS 87 
them, they proposed a conference, alleging that they were desirous of 
coming to terms. The object was, there can be no doubt, to gain time 
until the troops had left the island, orders having been given to that 
effect. The Governor, deceived by their assurances, allowed the troops to 
embark and sail, but on receiving authentic intelligence that the Maroons 
were determined to rise, he was fortunately enabled to recall at least a 
portion of the troops before hostilities began. The first defiance was. 
given early in July, 1795, the first actual outbreak nearly a month later, 
when the Maroons burned their own town, attacked the outposts and 
took to the mountains. Before the end of January, 1796, the war was 
practically over, the great body of the Maroons had signified their desire 
to surrender on conditions, one of these being that if they fulfilled the 
agreement to come in at once and lay down their arms, they should not 
be removed from the island; the third that they were to send back all 
fugitive slaves who had taken refuge among them. The non-fulfilment 
of this latter also left the determination of their destination an open 
question. Neither of these conditions was complied with and the Gov- 
ernor and Legislature determined to send them off. The agreement not 
to send them away was accepted by General Walpole on his word of 
honour, and when the resolution was taken to expel the Maroons from 
Jamaica, he felt keenly what he considered to be a breach of his agree- 
ment and refused to accept the sword of honour voted for him by the 
Assembly. This feeling was, no doubt, highly creditable to General 
Walpole’s high sense of honour, but the circumstances appear to indicate 
that it was due to an over-strained estimate of the obligation he had 
incurred towards the Maroons. That they did not come in and lay down 
their arms is undoubted, and that a second expedition to force them to 
come in is fully proved. That the other condition was also violated, by 
the non-delivery of the fugitive slaves, is not open to doubt. Add to this 
the necessity of getting rid once for all of a most dangerous element to 
the community and the removal was not only justifiable but necessary. 
Not on the latter ground had that stood by itself, and that the terms of 
the treaty had been carried out, for in that case the agreement, however 
imprudent, could not have been disregarded, except at the cost of public 
dishonour. 
The final surrender was accomplished by means of the second expe- 
dition, and the part played by the Cuban bloodhounds in securing this 
result has been made the most of. According to the account of General 
Walpole, the highest evidence on the subject, the dogs had nothing to do 
with the surrender, which he attributed entirely to his method of dealing 
with the Maroons by gentle means. Speaking of his success in bringing 
about a surrender, General Walpole, writing on 23rd January, 1796, says : 
“The dogs had certainly nothing to do with it; it was not, I apprehend, 
‘known to the Maroons that they were with us, for the Maroons had 
‘ moved the day before we did.” 
