92 REV. J. CLARK MURRAY ON 
be said to be unexceptionable. Similarity does not express the complete identity in nature, 
which the first law supposes; and Contiguity expresses a relation of space more 
appropriately than a relation in time. It seems unfortunate, therefore, that recent English 
psychologists should generally have overlooked the very suggestive nomenclature adopted 
for these laws by Sir William Hamilton,—the Law of Direct Remembrance, and the Law 
of Indirect Remembrance. * Perhaps these terms were suggested by the expressions, 
unmittelbare und mittelbare Reproduction, used by Herbart.+ Herbart’s expressions would be 
literally rendered into English by the words, immediate and mediate. These are the terms 
which Hamilton himself uniformly employs for the ideas which he expresses in the 
nomenclature of these laws by direct and indirect. It would not, therefore, be a violation of 
his own general usage to substitute the one set of terms for the other. 
Although the significance of the terminology adopted by Hamilton has been over- 
looked among English psychologists, yet it has not failed to find recognition in Germany. 
No man has done more for psychology in recent times than the late Professor Lotze ; and 
the language of his countryman Herbart is that which he also employs in speaking of the 
laws of association. The example of one of the greatest living psychologists may also be 
cited here, while it affords an opportunity of mentioning an apparently original suggestion 
of his own. Wundt not only refers to the terminology of Herbart, but he uses in addition 
the phrase, innere und üussere Association.§ These adjectives, which in English would be 
properly rendered by intrinsic and extrinsic, seem peculiarly adapted to distinguish associa- 
tions founded on intrinsic resemblances of mental states from those which imply merely 
the extrinsic accident of simultaneous occurrence in consciousness. 
Now, an instrinsic identity of mental states is the relation by which they are 
immediately associated ; simultaneity, on the other hand, operates only through the 
medium of some such identity. This may be illustrated by the example cited above,— 
the recognition of a friend’s voice, —which may be taken as a simple type of all association. 
In that instance it was shown that suggestion runs primarily and immediately along the 
line of the instrinsic resemblance between the sound heard now and the sound heard 
before. It was shown further, that it is only when the previous sound has been 
thus recalled, that through it there are reinstated in consciousness any of the attendant 
circumstances which went to make up the complete mental condition of the moment when 
that sound was heard. The action, therefore, of simultaneity as an associative or sugges- 
tive power, is always of necessity mediate. I have found it useful, especially with 
students, to illustrate the combined operation of these laws by means of a diagram like the 
following, in which, continuing the example already used, we may let S stand for a 
previous sound, ®: for any subsequent repetition of the same, while AS is a symbol for any 
mental states, like the visual appearance of a person, not necessarily having any resem- 

* See his Dissertation appended to Reid’s Works (Note D * * * pp. 192-3). Itis a matter of regret that this 
dissertation was left in an incomplete state at the author’s death, but it contains the only correct exposition of his 
doctrine. It seems strange that Mr. Mill, in his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy, should have based 
his criticism of this doctrine on a very imperfect and misleading exposition in Hamilton’s Lectures on Metaphysics. 
+ Werke, vol. V., pp. 24-5. 
{ Mikrokosmus, vol. I., p. 236. See also the recent outline of his lectures on psychology, Grundziige der Psycho- 
logie (1881), p. 22. 
4 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie, vol. IT, p. 300 (2nd ed.) 
