An Introduction to a Biology 



to the reality of the outside world or the sound- 

 ness of his explanations of it, because he has no 

 misgivings as to the efficacy of his perceptive and 

 interpretative machinery. Things as he sees them 

 are things as they are, because his perceptive 

 machinery is infallible. The causes of things as he 

 elucidates them are the true causes, because his 

 interpretative machinery is flawless. That, at any 

 rate, would appear to be the tacit assumption upon 

 which he acts. 



The reader may object that it is the business of 

 a philosopher and not of the biologist to deal with 

 the process of investigation. But if the philo- 

 sopher to whom the work is given is not an active 

 investigator, what can he know about investiga- 

 tion ? The eye of the philosopher is turned in- 

 wards. His interests are within. He is interested 

 in the outside world only as the material upon which 

 his mind feeds, or as a mirror in which it can see 

 itself. 



It seems likely, therefore, that that most inter- 

 esting region which intervenes between the mind 

 and things will fall between two stools. The inves- 

 tigator is interested in the things around him : the 

 philosopher in the mind within ; but very few are 

 interested in the relation or interaction between the 

 two. Now the process of investigation is a reci- 

 procal action which takes place between the two 

 poles, mind and object, across the region which 

 intervenes between them. This intervening: region 

 is apt to be neglected because men tend, according 

 to the inborn direction of their minds, to cluster 

 around one pole or the other. It must, however, 



7 



