17 

 other to increase their share of the catch. As a nuinber of 

 economists have pointed out, the result is inefficiency, over- 

 capitalization, higher prices for fish, over-exploitation of 

 the fish resources, declining catches, and, where opportunity 

 costs are high, the acceptance of low incomes (Crutchfield and 

 Pontecorvo, 1969; Hardin, 1968). 



Clearly, behavior which benefits individual fishermen 

 does not benefit the fish. We have been aware of this for 

 several year^. Strangely enough, fisheries biologists tend to 

 assume that the reverse is true — namely, that what is good for 

 the fish is good for the fishermen. After all, they argue, if 

 there were no fish, there would be no fishing industry. They 

 a-re fully aware that fishermen rarely go along with their plans 

 to manage fisheries, and sabotage them at every turn. The 

 biologists and administrators usually interpret this behavior 

 as evidence that fishermen are irrational, perhaps a little 

 stupid, and certainly not capable of acting with their own 

 enlightened self interest in mind. Usually, the biologists are 

 quick to urge the kind of repressive measures and forced regula- 

 tion of the industry that are common to countries with no demo- 

 cratic tradition. The results are political disaster. The idea 

 that the basic axiom on which they are working might be com- 

 pletely untrue does not easily suggest itself. 



In many fisheries (perhaps most fisheries) the idea that 

 what benefits the fish benefits the fishermen is utterly false. 

 The imposition of new fisheries management regulations is very 



