34 SANDFOED FLEMING ON 



What is commonly known as the " Government " or the " Administration," and how 

 it may be constituted, form no part of the problem, but are separate questions which I 

 do not projpose to discuss. I merely submit as a general principle, that the Government 

 may be considered in the light of a committee of Parliament, or executive council to carry 

 into effect the acts and resolutions of Parliament and administer aifairs to the approval 

 of Parliament. 



Nations diifer in their social and political circumstances, but in all free countries, at 

 ' least, it is generally recognised that the elective assembly is of the tirst importance. The 

 theory of the elective assembly, is that the whole people or such of the people as are duly 

 qualified to vote shall be equally represented. It cannot be said that hitherto this 

 object has been even approximately attained. Its attainment may indeed be impracticable, 

 but the question is of so much importance that it cannot be unworthy of grave consi- 

 deration. May we not ask if it be possible to devise some means, by which the whole 

 people of the realm may be brought to a central point, to a fociis so to speak, in a deli- 

 berative assembly or Parliament. 



The question of electing representatives to sit in Parliament has received the 

 attention of many political writers and has likewise been investigated at length by 

 many celebrated geometers, who have recorded their dissent from the practice followed. 

 Under the present system, members are elected by a part of the community only, while 

 their election is opposed by another part. It is quite true that the intention is to have the 

 majoritj' of the people represented, but even this is not a necessary result of the existing 

 system ; moreover it does not follow that the ma,]'ority of members returned will hold the 

 views and opinions of the majority of the people on any subject. It may happen and 

 frequently does happen, as a direct result of the present system, that legislative power is 

 placed, not in the representatives of a majority, but in those who represent a minority. 

 Sir John Lubbock gives an apt illustration of this result. He siipposes a country in 

 which there are 1,200,000 electors who vote with party A, and 1,000,000 who vote with 

 party B. Now if the two parties are evenly distributed over the whole country, it is clear 

 that, under the ordinary system of representation, the weaker party will be utterly 

 swamped. To use a familiar illustration (he remarks) whenever you drop a bucket into 

 the sea, you will bring up salt water. In such a case therefore the 1,000,000 will be 

 practically unrepresented. But we must carry the matter a little further. In the House 

 so elected, let the majority bring forward some bill of an advanced character and carry it 

 by two to one, i. e., by the votes of members representing 800,000 electors and against 

 those representing 400,000, in such a case it is clear that the minority in the House would 

 have with them also the 1,000,000 in the country who were left unrepresented ; so that 

 in fact the measure would represent the wishes of only 800,000 electors, and would be 

 opposed by those of 1,400,000. Thus he points out that the resvilt of a system " of 

 Government by majorities, is, on the contrary, to enable a minority of 800,000 to over- 

 rule a majority of 1,400,000." 



This illustrates only one of the many defects in the present system, but it is quite 

 suflicient to show that the principle of Representative Government which is inherently 

 good, has not been realised. It is obvious from the very nature of the system practised 

 in electing members, that, in every Parliament, not the whole but only a part of the 

 electors are represented, and that the representatives of a minority may frequently 

 overrule a majority of the people. 



