A POLITICAL PROBLEM. 35 



Take the preseut Parliament of our own Domiuiou, and in doing so wc have a case 

 in which all will acknowledge that the Administration at the present moment is sup- 

 ported by a large working majority of members. At the last G-eneral Election (Feb. 1887) 

 the total number of voters on the lists in all the constituencies where contests took place 

 was 948,524. Of this number the votes polled for one party were 3*70,342 and for the 

 other 354,*714. That is to say, 39 per cent, of the whole represents one party, and SY per 

 cent, the other party in Parliament. As the representatives of the 3*7 per cent, are 

 swamped in Parliament and are in no way recognised in the administration of affairs, it 

 follows that 39 per cent, of the electors through their representatives have complete 

 control, and the remaining 61 per cent, have practically no voice in the governnient of 

 the country. Moreover, as the election of members representing the 39 per cent, of votes 

 was in every instance opposed by the voters who number 3*7 per cent, of the whole, it 

 follows that on all questions settled on strict jîarty lines. Parliament speaks and acts in 

 its decisions by the members who represent but two per cent, of the whole body of electors. 

 This is not an accidental but a common and, indeed, a necessary result, of the present 

 system, which must continue so long as we follow the ordinary method of electing 

 members to sit in Parliament. 



The question presented is this : Is there any means whatever by which a national 

 assembly can be formed approximating more closely to the ideal Parliament ? 



Let us begin the inquiry by assuming that the electorate consists of only two electors, 

 that they are equal in all respects, in ability, in integrity, in worldly means, in public 

 spirit ; that they have each equal claims and equal desires to act as representatives, and 

 that each is equally willing to be represented the one by the other. 



Under such circumstances what course would be followed by the two to settle the 

 question? "Would not the natural method be to cast lots? Assuming that the two 

 electors were left to their own resources, removed from all outside influences, would 

 not this be the only rational means by which they could make a choice ? 



There are doubtless some minds who would have an innate feeling against resorting 

 to such a practice ; the casting of lots being more or less associated with dice-playing, 

 lotteries and games of chance, to which objections are taken on good and sufficient 

 grounds ; but in the case presented there remains no way of reaching a decision except 

 by lot. What other course could be followed ? A contest would not mend matters ; a 

 trial of physical strength and endurance would be at once futile and indefensible. If the 

 object be to turn the two into a single representative unit, unanimity is essential, and 

 while in agreeing in nothing else they could agree in casting lots. Is the principle of 

 settlement by casting lots in itself objectionable ? Was it not considered wise and good 

 in ancient times? And would it not be equally good to-day? It is certainly a time- 

 honored usage for determining difficiilt questions, and is exemplified in many passages 

 in Holy Scripture ; indeed the uniform voice of Scripture goes to show that decisions 

 thus obtained are not only wholly unobjectionable in themselves, but that they were 

 considered to have been overruled and directed by special providential interposition. 



I shall cite but one example, the selection of an apostle to take the place of Judas 

 Iscariot. An account of this election by casting lots is given in the " Acts of the Apostles," 

 Chap. I, verses 15-26. It is stated that about a hundred and twenty persons were called 

 upon to select one of their number. They proceeded with deliberate wisdom to follow a 



