A POLITICAL PEOBLEM. 37 



general result that the represeuttitives returned to sit in Parliament would collectively 

 represent the nation and fairly embody the reason coutaiued in the whole community. 

 There is one peculiarity of the system suggested which may be noticed ; in every case 

 the election of a representative would be effected deliberately and without conflict. It 

 would be accomplished in fact with unanimous assent. Each individual voter would 

 contribute towards a common result — a result which would be reached on principles 

 equally just and fair to all, and thus command general acquiescence. 



These results are attainable only by bringing to bear, on matters of doubt or diffi- 

 culty, the principle of .settlement adopted by the Apostles. That principle cannot be 

 objected to on scientific grounds, and those who hold the belief that mundane affairs are 

 over-ruled and directed, should have no difficulty in accepting it as a means of promoting 

 harmony and advancing the common good. The belief in a Providence, who takes 

 cognizance of the affairs of men, is the foundation of all religion ; communities therefore 

 the social fabric of which is based on Christianity should have no hesitation in leaving 

 matters of the highest moment to the arbitrament of an infinitely wise Providence rather 

 than to the settlement of ireu with all their individual interests and selfish views, all 

 their prejudices, all their passions, and all their errors of judgment. 



I have so far, for the purpose of the argument, assumed hypothetical cases ; it remains 

 to be considered how the principles laid down may be applied practically. Let us take 

 for example the election of a single representative in a constituency of 2,000 voters. It is 

 desirable in the first place that each voter, or group of voters of one mind, should have 

 perfect freedom of choice in the nomination. Suppose, in order to accommodate every 

 shade of opinion, it be arranged that each hundred voters of one way of thinking name 

 the person whom they would wish to represent them. This would separate the consti- 

 tuency into twenty groups of voters, who would each nominate whomsover they most 

 favored. It does not necessarily follow that there would be twenty persons nominated 

 in the constituency, as two or more groups might nominate the same person ; a circum- 

 stance which would increase the probability of his selection exactly in proportion to the 

 number of groups making him their nominee. On the twenty nominations being made, 

 the next step would be for the persons nominated to proceed, on the principles above set 

 forth, to select one of themselves. 



If unable to make an unanimous choice, they might, as in thp case of the twenty 

 electors choosing a representative, sort themselves into smaller groups and, by the 

 application of the principles set forth, proceed to reduce the number of voting units, and 

 finally, by the apostolic method, determine the selection of one person. The person so 

 chosen would be held to be the common choice of the whole 2,000 to represent the 

 constituency in Parliament. 



In the carrying out of such a system, there would be, as in every system, a number 

 of possible contingencies for which provision would have to be made ; these I have not 

 deemed it necessary at present to enter into. My object has been briefly to suggest 

 leading principles by which, as it appears to me, the central idea may be realized. If 

 the principles submitted be sound, I venture to think that it is not impracticable to 

 devise proper machinery to elect reiiresentatives who, when brought into one deliberative 

 gathering, would, so far as such a thing is possible, be a mathematical concentration of 

 the whole electoral body — would in fact constitute an assembly which would closely 

 approximate to the ideal Parliament. 



