140 ARCHBISHOP O'BRIEN ON THP] 



your fancy can imagine — still at some period the action, or motion, or resultant of complex 

 forces, which we call nature's laws, did not exist. If they came into existence in that far oft' 

 era as the eftect of some prior motion, that motion was either self-existent by necessity of 

 its nature, and was the primal cause of all, or what we call God ; or it was a contingent 

 motion, or force, and came at some time from a prior one. But make the chain of contingent 

 causes and eftects as long as we ma}', since each link is dependent on the preceding one, we 

 must, if we follow up with our intelligence the series, come eventually to the last one, which 

 depends on a self-existent cause. To maintain the opposite is a palpable absurdity ; it would 

 be to afiirm that there could be an endless chain whose every link was dependent, and yet 

 that the whole was not dependent. Thus our reason can prove that the primal cause, or 

 what Cicero called the " causa causarum," and Christians named God the Creator, is a self- 

 existent being from whom has come all force, or motion, or action. 



That this primal cause is no blind force, but is endowed with supreme intelligence, is 

 made abundantly manifest by the plan and order of creation. When a geologist exploring 

 a sand mound of the drift period, or a cave of the ante glacial era, jjicks up an arrow head, 

 be it ever so rude, or a flint chisel, he at once, and rightly, concludes that he has come upon 

 the work of man. Why ? Because he has found an instrument designed for, and adapted 

 to a foreseen end. Rude and unwieldy' it no doubt is ; lacking in beauty of form and excpii- 

 siteness of finish it is of a certainty ; yet it bears the impress of human intelligence, and is as 

 convincing a proof of man's handicraft, in some remote epoch, as is the most elaborately 

 complicated machine of to-day. The geologist has no hesitation in asserting that there is 

 no hypothesis to explain the existence of those awkward implements other than the one — 

 viz., the hand of man. 



Again, suppose a man who never saw a printed book, were to pick up a copy of Shake- 

 speare ; lie might, jjossibly, at first sight think the various letters were unmeaning blurs 

 made at hap-hazard. Suppose he is taught the alphabet, he will see that each blur has a 

 name and a value ; suppose his education goes on ; as it advances he learns that a combina- 

 tion of what he once thought blurs forms words ; and sets of words form sentences express- 

 ing ideas, and finally he grasps the connection of the parts, realizes the meaning of the plot, 

 and concludes from the human passion, and pathos and sjnniiathy of the piece, that a human 

 being with a richly endowed intelligence had traced the lines, now so full of purpose to his 

 soul, though formerly looked upon as accidentally produced marks on paper. 



With untutored mind, and untrained eye, and unthinking soul, many gaze on the firma- 

 ment above, and the earth round about, and fail to learn the lesson they teach. They see 

 nothing but blind forces working at random. They are not unlike the unlettered boor 

 turning over the pages of Shakespeare. But as they learn the language of the universe, 

 they discover law, order, design, adaptation, and such unity of purpose in diversity of action 

 as to engender an invincible certainty that its author was supremely intelligent. This has 

 been the conclusion of the most eminent men of science all through the ages who repeat the 

 far off" cry of the Hebrew singer, " The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firma- 

 ment declareth the work of his hands." 



Now since this intelligent self existing cause gave the initial impulse to all motion, or 

 existence to all force, or in other words since his action was the efficient cause of the order 

 of things, it follows that such action is not repugnant, whether considered in itself, or in its 

 relation to the laws of nature. The being who gave existence to the forces can, therefore. 



