224 ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 
The Indians of Illinois were at this time in such distress from the 
failure of their corn the summer before and the scarcity of game, that 
they were living upon bark and roots, and had sent a deputation to 
Governor Harrison, begging in the most humble manner for a small 
supply of provisions to keep their families from starving. They were 
told with impolitic harshness that they would receive no assistance until 
the men who had committed some recent murders were surrendered. 
So far from having the desired effect, this declaration only drove them 
mto open hostility in the end. Owing to their helpless condition at 
that time, Harrison felt no apprehension that they would attempt an 
offensive movement until “ roasting ear season,” and began to assemble 
a small force of regulars and militia at Vincennes to overawe and 
deter them from leaving their families to join the British at Amherst- 
burg.? 
While awaiting orders to begin offensive operations, General Hull 
removed his encampment to a position in rear of the town of Detroit 
and began to collect boats for the passage of the river. While thus 
employed, Tarhe, the principal chief of the Wyandots, called upon him 
to remonstrate against the seizure of a number of horses left at Browns- 
town by the Sioux before they crossed the river and they were at once 
restored. | 
On July 9th Hull received a letter from the Secretary of War 
giving him discretionary authority to assume the offensive. “ Should 
the force under your command be equa! to the enterprise consistent 
with the safety of your own posts,” he wrote, “ you will take possession 
of Malden and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify. 
It is only proper to inform you that an adequate force cannot soon be 
relied on for the reduction of the enemy’s posts below you.” ? 
By this time Hull had become less confident, but replied that he 
was making preparations to cross the river and hoped to take possession 
of Sandwich in a few days. “The British command the water and 
the savages,” he added, “I do not think the force here equal to the 
reduction of Amherstburg. You must, therefore, not be too sanguine.” 3 
Already he began to foresee difficulties in obtaining supplies and 
to entertain doubts whether he had acted wisely in making Detroit his 
base of operations instead of Brownstown or the Miami, where his line 


1 Harrison to Eustis, 4th March, 1812; Dawson’s Life of Harrison, pp. 
270-2; Harrison to Eustis, July 7th, 1812. 
? Hull, Memoirs, pp. 40-1. This letter was garbled by General Hull by 
the omission of the last sentence. See Defence of General Dearborn by 
H. A. S. Dearborn, p. 10. 
3 Forbes, Trial of General Hull, Appendix II, p. 9. 
