418 LF M.. KOVLE [DECEMBER 
detail of description and fact without law or connection, or tending too 
much the other way, show too much of the observer and become guilty 
of anthropomorphism. The latter attitude is but too prevalent amongst 
opponents and upholders alike of the theory of natural selection. 
The attitude here advocated les between these two. The details 
and facts are welcomed, but “facts” do not make true knowledge, and 
on the other hand, any theory which makes the observer inclined to 
read into the facts his own personal notions of “ utility ” or “ advantage,” 
for example, must be considered as too prone to misinterpret the actual 
phenomena. What we wish rather is the attitude of a philosopher 
who perceives well the facts, but holds himself aloof from opinion, and 
seeks some method as an intermediary and aid to interpretation. What 
this method should be is not difficult to conceive. 
The outstanding feature in the Darwinian hypothesis—seized upon 
by its clerical critics at the first appearance of the Origin of Species— 
was the stress laid upon “chance.” The conception therein involved 
was—not that anything ever happened at random or haphazard, but 
that the changes occurring might be conveniently so expressed. As is 
well known, this theory of chance has been developed more and more 
of recent years as a separate study, until the biologist has come to 
regard it with suspicion as something foreign to his own subject. And 
yet is there not some truth in this theory of chance? And again, have 
natural selectionists the prerogative of this truth ? 
The truth underlying this theory is not far to seek. Life, we may 
say, depends on many “chances.” Hence, knowing the various sources 
of danger, we may, as if insurance agents, calculate the “ chance” of a 
particular individual surviving to a certain age. In a deeper sense, 
again, if we knew the causes of variation we should be able to calculate 
the “chance” of the appearance of any particular variation under 
certain conditions. What we have before us at any time is only 
partially the truth, and even if we knew all that had ever occurred and 
understood all, we—not being omnipotent—could only state as a 
probability what would occur next. 
This is the justification for the theory of “chance,” or we should 
rather say of “ probability.”’ Has the theory of natural selection 
any exclusive right to this conception ? 
We may judge of this more closely by following the facts grouped 
under the three propositions stated above. From (1) we learn that 
the variations in any character are naturally grouped about a certain 
average, and are usually distinguished as plus and minus variations from 
that average. If then we hold by natural selection, and maintain that 
by this law evolution may proceed by slow minute steps, so that “even 
a grain in the balance shall decide which shall live and which shall 
die,”—-which variations shall we call “useful” or “favourable”? If it 
1 A mathematical description of the meaning underlying these words will be found in the 
‘Chances of Death,” by Karl Pearson. 
