430 Bi A BATHE R [DECEMBER 
many other things, which are the results of life, not its cause. The 
second statement of Paley’s argument has for its major premise 
“ Evidence of usefulness is evidence of design.” But this also is just 
what has to be proved, and it certainly cannot be laid down as a 
universal proposition. 
But it is late in the day to be discussing the logic of the argument 
from design, and it is only for sake of reference that I venture on a 
more complete statement :—(1) Watches and the like are admirably 
fitted for a useful purpose. (2) They are the result of design. There- 
fore (3) other things admirably fitted for a useful purpose are probably 
the result of design. (4) The structure of living things is so fitted. 
(5) Therefore they are evidence of design. Design in every case is 
understood to imply a designing mind. ‘This cannot carry conviction. 
Premise (2) is an induction liable to be upset by a new fact. Pro- 
position (3) is an argument from analogy only. Premise (4) can only 
be proved by the accumulation of instances. 
The argument, in short, is one of probabilities, and the important 
question is how far those are affected by the acceptance of natural 
selection. 
Dr. Brooks rightly remarks that “the mere extension of the domain 
of natural causation,” “the demonstration of the mutability of species,” 
in a word, evolution by descent, cannot give a blow to the argument. 
The fitness is not thereby affected, and the conception of design 
appears even more necessary. 
Nor does the substitution of physical causes in place of special 
creation weaken the inference. ‘The fitness remains, however brought 
about; and there is no reason why the designer should not work 
through physical causes. 
Huxley is represented by Dr. Brooks as saying that there is a 
wider teleology which is untouched by natural selection; but his 
words are—*“ not touched by the doctrine of evolution ”—a very different 
matter, as Huxley always insisted. What he did say about the 
Darwinian theory was that it was absolutely “opposed to teleology as 
it is commonly understood.” Since the commoner teleologists agreed 
with Huxley in this opinion at least, it is fruitless for Dr. Brooks to 
raise objections. How far the more subtle teleologists may be affected 
is another matter. 
The new aspects of the case introduced by admitting the all-potency 
of natural selection seem, put baldly, to be these :—Our proposition 
(4) ceases to be true; since natural selection implies that for every 
individual which is fit and persists, a hundred or a thousand are unfit 
and perish. This is a different idea from the absence of perfection in 
those selected, which would not invalidate the argument from design. 
Applying the teleologist’s favourite analogy, the present point may be 
enforced in two ways, thus: that a designer 99°9 per cent of whose 
plans are rejected has chosen a wrong profession; or that if of a 
