feegie 4 ZOOLOGTIST ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE. 431 
thousand stones one happens to fit a hole in the wall, this is no proof 
that it was shaped with that hole in view. 
Next, the probability of proposition (3) is lessened. The argu- 
ment from analogy loses much of its force. Watches may be good or 
bad, but from the beginning they have been made with the express 
design of measuring the divisions of the day; to reach this result, 
obstacles are overcome and portions of the physical universe bent to 
the will of the designer. On the theory of natural selection, the 
evolving species presents none of these features; we deceive ourselves 
when we see in the Palaeozoic brachiopod signs of the direction in 
which its Mesozoic descendants will evolve; obstacles if presented are 
not overcome, but cause the line of evolution to swerve; no part of 
the physical environment is controlled by the species to its good, 
but the history of the species is controlled by the environment. 
The argument from design, as stated by the older teleologists, seems 
to be seriously weakened by the theory of natural selection as stated 
by Darwin. On the other hand, that same theory may, as Dr. Brooks 
shows, enable us to restate the argument in a more convincing manner. 
First it is to be noted that all human contrivances are subject to 
natural selection in the same way as are the contrivances of other 
animals and as the animals themselves. This strengthens the analogy, 
but does not render it anything other than analogy; for lability to 
natural selection is no proof of similarity in other respects. Natural 
selection, to adopt a phrase dear to Dr. Brooks, shows how things 
happen, but it does not show why they happen. 
Further consideration reveals a more fundamental change in our 
ideas. “The modern zoologist,’ says Dr. Brooks, “must ask whether 
we are sure that nothing but mind accounts for watches” (p. 259). 
“The progress of zoology has forced us to ask anew the old question 
whether a watch may not be part of the chain of physical causation 
just as truly as the spider's web or the cat. . . . The discovery of 
natural selection has put the matter in a new light” (p. 264). If the 
suggestion be admitted, “ Paley’s analogy” does indeed “ become im- 
pregnable,”’ but his major premise (that mind is the cause) becomes 
the proposition to be proved. 
The problem remains, but must be attacked in another way. 
Whatever be the explanation of the phenomena of life, there is no 
doubt as to the usefulness of those phenomena to the living beings 
that exhibit them; and in this lies an apparent distinction between 
living and not living things. This faculty of using or controlling 
portions of the physical world, a faculty which Dr. Brooks chooses to 
express by the word “contrivance,” may be regarded as “ interference 
with the order of physical nature” (p. 273). Without following Dr. 
Brooks in his discussions of personal identity and spontaneous genera- 
tion, we may agree to the continuity of life, and must admit that this 
faculty is coextensive with life. Now natural selection shows us the 
