A DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE. 105 
the facts which belong to them, is undoubtedly the 
basis upon which this and all other sciences repose : 
but if the zoologist or the botanist contents himself 
with this information, —if he remains satisfied with 
isolated descriptions drawn up in technical language, 
— and compiles a dictionary, under the name ofa 
system, of hard names, he has no more right to 
term his pursuits intellectual, or to dignify them 
with the name of science, than the astronomer wou!d 
have, under the circumstances just supposed. All 
branches of natural science, however varied may 
be their materials, or however diversified their 
nature, have but one and the same object in view 
—the discovery of the primary laws of nature. In 
comparison with this, all other objects, however 
superior they may be in point of utility, yet, in 
reference to sound philosophy, are of a secondary 
or subordinate nature. As all sciences are based 
upon facts, known, or to be known from experience, 
so are they, in their early state of developement, 
matters of pure observation. It is only when we 
have acquired the power of generalising these facts, 
when such generalisations agree among themselves 
and with every thing we see or know of nature, 
that the theory of a science becomes either abso- 
lutely demonstrative, or approaches so near to cer- 
tainty, by the force of analogical reasoning, that it 
is not contradicted by any thing known. The case 
of natural history, then, is precisely this : in its early 
stages it is a science of observation ; in its latter, it is 
one of demonstration. There are few, indeed, even 
among philosophers, who have the least suspicion 
that natural history is deserving of this character. 
