28 ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 



3. The latent powers of a dissolution of parliament, which may be 

 used at anytime by the Crown, under the advice of responsible ministers, 

 with the view of obtaining the opinion and judgment of the people at a 

 political crisis — a safety valve wanting in the rigid system of the United 

 States, which constantly and necessarily creates friction between the 

 executive and legislative authorities. 



4. A permanent Civil Service in the Dominion and provincial gov- 

 ernments — a system which lies at the very foundation of all stable 

 government, but only partially adopted of very recent years by the 

 national government of the United States, and now urged in almost all 

 the old States of the Union. 



5. The appointment of all judges and public officials by the Crown, 

 on the advice of ministers responsible to parliament for every such 

 executive act, in contradistinction to the elective system of the United 

 States of the federal republic, where judges are, in most cases, elected by 

 the people — the federal judges being the exception. 



«J. The independence of the judiciary of all party and political 

 pressure, when once appointed, since they can be removed only by the 

 ■Crown, as a consequence of a successful impeachment by the Dominion 

 Parliament, while in the several states their tenure is limited to a certain 

 number of years — ten on the average. 



7. The infrequency of political elections and the practical separation 

 of national, provincial and municipal politics at such elections — a sej^ara- 

 tion now advocated in many states and adopted by the revised New 

 York constitution, in the case of municipal elections, especially in the 

 cities, where the running of municipal officers on a federal or state ticket 

 has led to gross corruption and abuse by the political machine and its 

 professional politicians. 



8. The trial by judges of all cases of briber}^ and corruption in 

 municipal as well as legislative elections, a system not yet adopted by the 

 States, and necessarily of doubtful application in a country where so 

 many judges are elective. 



No doubt there are difficulties constantly occurring in the working 

 of the Canadian federal constitution, arising from conflicts of juris- 

 diction between the Dominion and the Provinces, despite the careful 

 enumeration of powers in the fundamental law, or British North 

 America Act of 1867 ; but these doubts are gradually being removed by 

 the wise practice which places the interpretation of all written legal 

 instruments in the courts. 



Here also the wisdom and learning of the Judicial Committee of the 

 Privy Council of England and of the Canadian judiciary are to a large 

 extent nullifying the contentions of politicians and bringing about a 

 solution of difficulties which, in a country divided between distinct 

 nationalities, might cause serious complications if not settled on sound 

 principles of law which all can accept. 



