198 ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 



cav'se there is no certain way of having the consciousness that the ani- 

 mal has. But that these monkeys have often acted objectively just as 

 human beings act when they have these mental activities is most certain. 

 I am inclined to believe that the hujuan and animal consciousness are 

 not really different in kind but only in degree; the difference in degree, 

 however, is very great." Mr. Hobhouse believes that there come 

 points in growth where change of degree becomes change of kind, 

 and refers to the fact that water may become vapour or ice according to 

 the rate of vibration of the constituent molecules. However, analogies 

 are proverbially dangerous. 



With this writer's other views on the relation of human and animal 

 intelligence as' expressed in the following words, I find myself in accord: 

 " Human intelligence develops out of a lower form by growth in this 

 feature of Comprehension on the one hand and Articulateness on the 

 other, by which the higher stage of animal intelligence was marked off 

 from the lower. Mind, it is suggested, differs from mind in the degree 

 in which these ipowers are developed, in the experience which it can 

 comprehend and in the articulateness with which it can comprehend 

 it." 



A noteworthy recent contribution to our subject is the address of 

 Prof. C. S. Minot to the American Association for the Advancement of 

 Science on " The Problem of Consoiousness in its Biological Aspects," 

 from which it appears that the professed psychologists are not doing all 

 the thinking on psychology or philosophy. His general attitude may 

 be understood from the following passage: "We must look to biolo- 

 gists for the mighty generalisations to come rather than to the philoso- 

 phers, because great new thoughts are generated more by the accumu- 

 lation of observations than by deep meditation. To know, observe. 

 Observe more and more and in the end you will know. A generalisation 

 is a mountain of observations; from the summit the outlook is broad, 

 the great observers climb to the outlook while the mere thinker struggles 

 to imagine it. The best that can be achieved by sheer thinking on the 

 data of ordinary human experience, we have already as our glorious in- 

 heritance. The principal contribution of science to human ^jogress is 

 the recognition of the value of accumulating data which are found out- 

 side of ordinary human experience." Minot's cardinal principle is thus 

 expressed: "Tihe function of consciousness is to dislocate in time the 

 reactions from sensations." " Conscious inhibitation is thus distinct 

 from reflex action; the potential reaction may, however, be stored up 

 and effect future conduct. Consciousness has a selective power mani- 

 fest both in choosing from sensations received at the same time and in 

 combining sensations received at different times. It may make syn- 



