562 THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 



correct, in place of the present probable, processes in the interpreta- 

 tion of records will produce essential correctness, and bring the result 

 to the scientific basis of necessary conclusions without rejecting en 

 bloc all the present probable conclusions. By that substitution, some 

 of the results now accepted on the basis of probability would be dis- 

 carded, others that are now discarded would be accepted; but on the 

 whole, much that is now accepted as probable would stand also the 

 test of necessity (because many contemporaneous records exemplify 

 the five requisites and are therefore adjudged trustworthy under either 

 process, p. 544 above) and would require acceptance under a proper 

 treatment of records; and this acceptance, instead of being under the 

 present fog of doubt and uncertainty, would stand upon a common 

 level with all the sciences, including the most exact. 



3. Use of reasoned probability in practical affairs and in practical 

 applications of the sciences. The present use of reasoned probability 

 as a positive criterion in history is suggested by its use as a positive 

 criterion where none better is available, and a decision is necessary, 

 in practical affairs. These situations continually arise both in ordin- 

 ary practical affairs, and in practical applications of the sciences such 

 as medicine and the law. Thus, in medical practice, a satisfactory 

 diagnosis is often not possible short of an autopsy; and the physician, 

 therefore, in so far as he cannot fully apply his correct process, rightly 

 makes the necessary decision on the only available basis of probability. 

 The courts, also, being required to decide between two parties, give 

 the decision in civil cases according to the weight of evidence, whether 

 this excludes reasonable doubt, or establishes only a reasonable prob- 

 ability. As an abstract principle, the plaintiff, since the burden of 

 proof rests primarily on him, might be required either to establish his 

 case beyond reasonable doubt, or lose his suit. Practically, however, 

 the enforcement of this principle against a personal claim which is not 

 absolutely established, and yet is supported by a substantial prepon- 

 derance of evidence, would be a personal hardship and would place a 

 premium upon trespass, because the injuring party can usually plan 

 to take the other unawares and thus has every opportunity to fore- 

 stall and to destroy all evidence of the trespass. The last is even more 

 true of criminal acts; but since the 18th century criminal charges, at 

 first only in capital cases, but now in others as well (with the doubtful 

 exception of criminal charges arising in civil proceedings), must be 

 proved beyond reasonable doubt; and in this respect the courts exem- 

 plify the requirement of pure science. This exemplification and the 

 resulting hindrance to the prosecution involve no personal hard- 

 ship because the prosecutor, or state, is an impersonal institution. 

 Science is essentially impersonal; and history itself, as a science, 



