68 INTRODUCTION. 



have sought no privileges for themselves in Japan ; hut they have, in equity, desired and ohtained 

 treatment similar to that of others, when to these favors were granted." 



These are the facts as set forth hy the Dutch, and this the extent of their claims ; nor would 

 we in the slightest degree detract from what may be justly their due. We confess, however, that, 

 to us, the importance as well as effects of Dutch co-operation in our treaty seem to be somewhat 

 exaggerated. It sometimes happens that men and nations cannot work to the production of 

 their own particular ends without thereby contributing, whether they wish it or not, to the 

 accomplishment of similar ends sought hy others. The success, however, of others, which they 

 never sought, and which is but an accident resulting from their efforts to another end, can scarcely 

 he claimed as a ground of merit, or demand very loud acknowledgments from those who may 

 have been thus casually benefitted. The basis of a claim, quanhcm meruit, is some benefit 

 purposely done by one to another, or some loss purposely sustained for his advantage. We 

 readily concede that the Dezima chief, with the draft of the Dutch treaty in his possession, 

 strove faithfully and judiciously, as became him, to induce the Japanese authorities to accede 

 to the terms of that treaty and sign it, before our ambassador could reach Japan. Of this we 

 have no right to complain. We concede also that his proceedings brought to the knowledge of 

 the Japanese what the nature of a commercial treaty was, and furnished them also with some 

 valuable hints as to some of its provisions,which afforded them topics of reflection and investigation, 

 and prepared them for the consideration of our treaty when it should be proposed; but it will 

 scarcely be pretended that the Dutch action was prompted by the direct design of aiding the 

 United States; and still less, that it induced the Japanese government to depart from its long 

 established policy of exclusion. The Dutch were themselves endeavoring to negotiate a treaty ; 

 and such a departure must be pre-supposed before it was expedient to present the terms of a 

 treaty at all. 



But further, as to this point of departing from their settled policy, it is on the record, that the 

 letter of the King of Holland himself on this very subject, written in 1844, was answered by the 

 Japanese government in 1845, with a most explicit declaration that they would not abandon 

 their ancient policy and usage. At this time then (1845) the Dutch seem to have accomplished 

 nothing ; and it is not on the record that they ever renewed their effort from this time forward 

 until 1852, when they kneiu the American expedition would certainly be sent; and the mode of 

 renewal was to offer to Japan a treaty which they had prepared to suit themselves, and which was 

 for their own benefit. For it will be remembered that by that treaty no foreign nation was to 

 be allowed by treaty to trade with Japan, but on certain bases, laid down in the 4th article of 

 the Dutch draft. Now suppose Japan had signed the treaty proposed to her hy Holland, 

 what would have necessarily resulted? The following consequences, vi^;: 



1. That the Dutch should alone dictate what kind of treaties all other foreign nations might 

 make with Japan. 



2. That Japan, an independent power, should preclude herself from the right of making any 

 treaty but such as Holland should approve. 



3. That as Holland was to be placed on the footing of the most favored nations in any treaty 

 Japan might make, the Dutch, in addition to the privileges they already possessed in Japan, 

 and in addition to any others they might obtain by future negotiation, should have also every 

 privilege of every kind that any nation might chance to get by treaty. 



Had the Dezima chief succeeded in negotiating his treaty before Commodore Perry's arrival, 

 would it have benefitted the United States? 



