72 INTRODUCTION. 



enter into negotiations witli foreign nations (other than the Hollanders) without the co-operation 

 of the Mikado ; and it is easy to understand that the Mikado will decide for or against a treaty 

 according to the will of the Council of State. All these are only pretexts, and the sole reason 

 why the Japanese ohject to more intimate relations with foreigners is the fear that Christianity 

 may be introduced into the country, and so the Siogun dynasty, which consolidated itself hy the 

 extermination of Christianity, may he put in jeopardy. The fanatic Gutzlaif and Father For- 

 cade, (now in Heaven, I hope,) the narrow-minded missionaries, have, by their conduct of late, 

 contributed to excite afresh the fears of the Japanese government, who saw in these two mission- 

 aries the whole of Christendom marching against Japan. 



" It shows a want of caution, in that the letter of the honorable President states that the mes- 

 sengers whom he has sent to the Emperor of Japan are not missionaries. Why insert this 

 assurance, calculated to excite distrust ? It is a matter of course that an ambassador is not a 

 missionary ; and what guarantee can be given to the Japanese government that there prevails 

 no intention to propagate Christianity in Japan ? No maritime power but Holland enjoys her 

 confidence. Holland only can make a movement to open Japan to the commerce of the world. 

 Holland has not listened to my advice, and will repent it." 



" Please to pray Commodore Perry not to allow his jjatience to be exhausted, to receive quietly 

 the objections of the Japanese government ; but then he must declare decidedly that America 

 will not trouble herself about the present religion and politics of Japan. America leaves these 

 untouched, but insists on a commercial treaty to be effected by peaceful negotiation. Probably 

 the proposals will not be listened to ; but beg Commodore Perry not to make hostile demonstra- 

 tions against the good, faithful, innocent people of Japan, but to intimate to the Japanese gov- 

 ernment that it is in his power to destroy their cities, ships, and men, but that to do so would give 

 him pain ; that he will therefore give them a year to consider his proposals, because he would not 

 by force of arms seek to obtain conditions which might as well be secured by friendly measures." 



" Then, if notice is given to me in proper time, I would still be willing to submit a plan by 

 which the United States government may attain its purposes." 



With reference to this letter, in the pamphlet before us M. Von Siebold states that by means 

 of his " correspondent on board the Mississijipi" he did not fail " to advise Commodore Perry to 

 follow a peaceful plan, which counsel seems to have borne good fruit." 



It is very remarkable how strikingly facts in the history of our negotiation have contradicted 

 the confident predictions of this gentleman, who professed such "profound knowledge and long 

 experience of Japanese affairs." 



The Dutch, he states, were the only people who could establish a commercial treaty with Japan, 

 and they had undertaken to sustain our effort. The facts are, that they were not able to make 

 a treaty for themselves until long after ours was consummated ; that their support of our efforts 

 consisted, as we have shown, in the attempt to make a treaty for themselves before our arrival, 

 committing the Japanese to agree to no treaty with any foreign power but such as they 

 prescribed ; and that from the arrival to the dei^arture of our ships in no mode, either directly 

 or indirectly, did they have any communication with the Dutch, nor was the aid of the latter 

 either invoked or employed in the slightest degree in the negotiation of our treaty. 



M. Von Siebold predicted that our overtures would be declined, or that a final answer would 

 be delayed as long as ijossible. The facts are, that our overtures were not declined, and that, 

 under the circumstances of the death of the Emperor and other events, the delay was not unrea- 

 sonably long. The squadron returned to Yeddo bay on the 13th of February, and all tha 



