270 EXPEDITION TO JAPAN. 



The Japanese officials now prepared to depart, and finally, after expressing in the most 

 courteous terms their thanks for the treatment they had received, and their regret on leaving 

 their American friends, shook all the officers warmly by the hand, and went bowing and 

 smiling over the side of the ship into their boat. No sooner were they seated on their mats, 

 than Yezaimen showed his appreciation of the present of wine by ordering one of the cases to 

 be immediately opened, and taking the first bottle that came, impatiently knocked off its neck, 

 and without more ado commenced imbibing its contents, probably desiring, with his usual 

 courtesy, to drink a parting health to his American friends. His boat soon pulled out of sight 

 behind the projecting promontory of Uraga, and nothing more was seen of the courteous 

 Yezaimen and his worthy and learned associates Tatznoske and Toksaro. 



The survey of the west side of the magnificent bay having been completed from Uraga to a 

 point about fourteen miles below Yedo, and the steamer Mississippi having ascended with the 

 boats and sounded six miles nearer to that capital, the Commodore believed that a sufficient 

 knowledge was obtained of the navigation of the bay to conduct the man-of-war, the Vermont, 

 which was to join his squadron on his next visit, to the American anchorage, or even higher if 

 necessary. 



The governor of Uraga, as will have been observed, had evinced a great anxiety, during the 

 several conferences on board the Susquehanna, to learn how long the Commodore intended to 

 remain on the coast. On these occasions Yezaimen always took care to remark that it was the 

 custom of the Japanese government to be very slow in deciding upon matters having reference 

 to foreign countries. In consequence of these representations, and knowing that the propo- 

 sitions contained in the President's letter were of such importance as to require time for 

 deliberation, overturning, as they would, if acceded to, many of the fundamental laws of the 

 Empire, the Commodore deemed it advisable not to wait for a reply. To these were added 

 other reasons of importance. The Commodore had not provisions or water sufficient to allow of 

 his remaining on the coast more than a month longer, and he well knew that the Japanese 

 authorities could easily, and with every apparent show of reason, defer any satisfactory reply to 

 a period beyond the time when it would be absolutely necessary for him to leave. They woidd 

 be prepared, as an excuse for delay, to allege the necessity of calling together and conferring 

 with the princes of the Empire, as also of consulting the Dairi or Ecclesiastical Emperor, and 

 thus the Commodore might be put off from day to day, and ultimately be obliged to sail without 

 any satisfaction whatever. Such a result would have been construed into a triumph by the 

 Japanese, and would have caused, as the Commodore believed, a serious injury to the success of 

 his mission. 



The Commodore, moreover, was glad to have a good excuse for waiting until the ensuing 

 spring for the final answer from the Japanese government, because he knew that some of his 

 ships were required to protect American interests on the coast of China, then somewhat 

 endangered in consequence of the disturbed state of that country. He could not spare any of 

 the squadron while he remained in Japan, for the vessels promised by the Navy Department 

 had not yet followed him as he had expected. He was also unprepared to respond with becoming 

 courtesy to any concession or act of friendliness on the part of the Japanese government, in 

 consequence of not having received the presents from the United States that were expected in 

 the Vermont, and which it was essential to have ready upon the reception of a favorable answer 

 to the President's letter. 



