Section IL, 1913. [129] Trans. R.S.C. 



From Isle aux Noix to Chateauguay. A Study of the military operations 

 on the Frontier of Lower Canada in 1812 and 1813. 



By Colonel E. A. Cruikshank. 

 (Read May 28th 1913) 



1812 



"After the war one ought to write not only the history of what 

 has happened, but the history of what was intended, the narrative 

 would then be instructive. " — Von der Goltz. 



In an advisory letter to the Secretaiy of War for the United States, 

 dated the 2nd of January, 1812, Geneial Aimstrong had pointed out 

 most forcibly that the fortress of Quebec must necessarily be the ulti- 

 mate objective of an invading army, seeking to accomplish the conquest 

 of Canada. The means for the execution of such an enterprise were 

 evidently not then available. But the occupation of the island of Mon- 

 treal, which, by its situation, commanded the navigation of the St. 

 Lawrence and Ottawa, must certainly cause the abandonment oi surren- 

 der of all the military posts above the cutting them off from their com- 

 mon basis of supply. He accordingly proposed that an advance upon it 

 should be made rapidly and boldly by a sufficient force from the vicinity 

 of Albany while demonstrations with large bodies of militia should be 

 simultaneously undertaken on the Niagara river, from Sackett's Harbour 

 and from Vermont along the right bank of the Sorel rivei, to prevent 

 the concentration of troops from other garrisons for its defence. 



This plan was approved and orders were given for the organisation 

 of a force of eight thousand men of which Major General Dearborn was 

 directed to take command. For such a service it was not unreasonably 

 presumed that his experience in a former campaign of invasion would be 

 exceptionally valuable. Govei'nor Tompkins of New York gave the most 

 energetic support from the, first. Early in April, six hundred militia 

 were ordered by him to march to the Niagara, six hundred more to the 

 mouth of Black River and two hundred and fifty to Oswego. 



In transmitting to Sir George Prévost early information of the 

 orders for the movement of these troops, Mr. Augustus Foster, the 

 British envoy at Washington, expressed the opinion that the Govern- 

 ment of the United States hoped that something might occur to provoke 

 a collision with the British garrisons on the frontier and thus beein hos- 



