[Bowman] FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES IN HISTORICAL SCIENCE 149 
than might at first be supposed; for in point of fact the characteristic 
of unselfishness which is cited in this answer requires classification 
under the entire five requisites. Thus it requires unselfishness to make 
the thorough investigation which may be necessary for right discern- 
ment (i) if the matter to be investigated is disagreeable or revolting in 
itself, and still more if the investigation will involve the exposure of 
facts unpleasant for one’s self; it requires unselfishness to inform a 
hearer exactly according to his interest (ii) if the information given 
involves the giver in discredit or embarrassment; it requires unselfish- 
ness to be impartial (ii) where one’s own interests are opposed to the 
interests of others; it requires unselfishness to preserve a proper poise. 
(iv) in describing an action whereby one has been justly aggrieved; 
and it requires self-abnegation, 7.e., unselfishness, of an exceedingly 
high order for a person, e.g. a scholar, to exclude from his published, 
and therefore spontaneous, statements an admittedly unnecessary con- 
clusion (v) where this conclusion is a favorite hypothesis, for the cor- 
rectness of which, after patient and prolonged investigation, he can 
establish a high degree of probability but not a perfectly closed case. 
Unselfishness and courage, indeed, are pervading and indispensable 
factors in the attainment. of trustworthiness; and the statement often 
made that it is a cowardly thing to he can be definitely shown to have 
no less application in science than in morals. 
All of the characteristics voluntarily cited by any one person 
related usually to but one of the five requisites for trustworthiness, and 
rarely to more than two. In the requisite or requisites to which the 
answers related, however, there was variety; and where the person, 
having completed his voluntary answer, was questioned further as to 
the requisites to which his answer had not chanced to relate, he readily 
admitted that he held those qualities also to be requisite for trust- 
worthiness. Thus if he said concerning the individual whom he trusted, 
“He is fair to everybody,” recognizing thereby the need of impartiality 
(in), he readily admitted, when further questioned, that to merit trust 
an individual must also be capable of right discernment and clear state- 
ment (i), that he must have it in view to inform the hearer according 
to the hearer’s interest (11), that he must be moderate in his language 
and not overstate things (iv), and that he will not advance conclusions 
which he cannot declare it is necessary to believe (v). In fact every 
person of whom inquiry was made acknowledged freely that if the in- 
dividuals in whom he confided were lacking in any of the five requisites, 
such individuals, in so far as these requisites were lacking, would not be 
trustworthy and would cease to hold his confidence. 
None of the persons of whom inquiry was made had ever instituted 
a set investigation concerning any individual whom they held to be 
