[Bowman] FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES IN HISTORICAL SCIENCE 161 
and disrupt in a sense our knowledge of history, these far reaching and 
regrettable consequences would be no reason for accepting such records 
as essentially trustworthy where a case for acceptance cannot be 
established as a necessary conclusion on scientific grounds. In point of 
fact, however, as is proven on the seven grounds above enumerated, 
ach of which affords a conclusive and necessary reason for acceptance, 
suspicion of a record that exemplifies the requisites for trustworthiness, 
merely because there are no parallel records to check or corroborate it, 
is not a scientific doubt: it is an unscientific and, so to speak, patho- 
logical affection of the mind. In this connection it should be noted, 
further, that an essential agreement in statements, which is the only 
check that a parallel record can afford, is a corroboration indeed, but a 
corroboration only. Essential agreement between parallel records does 
not in itself establish the trustworthiness of any of the records in 
essential agreement. By the bare fact of essential agreement between, 
e.g., two parallel records all that is established scientifically (7.e., as a 
necessary conclusion) is that both of the records may be trustworthy or 
both of them may be untrustworthy; but whether they are actually 
trustworthy or untrustworthy, would be still an open question. On the 
other hand, by the bare fact of essential disagreement between two 
such records all that is established scientifically is that both of the 
records cannot be trustworthy, though one of them may; but whether 
one of them is actually trustworthy, and if so, which, would be still 
an open question. Therefore, by the bare fact of essential agreement 
or disagreement between parallel records nothing is established con- 
cerning the actual trustworthiness of any one of them. Scientifically, 
the actual trustworthiness of any record, whether corroborated or con- 
tradicted by parallel records, must be established by the demonstrable 
exemplification of the five requisites for trustworthiness in the record 
itself. Where such exemplification can be demonstrated in a record, the 
record, though uncorroborated by parallel records, must be accepted 
as essentially trustworthy. Where such exemplification cannot be 
demonstrated in a record, the record, though corroborated by parallel 
records in which the requisites for trustworthiness are not exemplified, 
dare not be accepted as essentially trustworthy. Where such exempli- 
fication can be demonstrated in parallel records, and they are, therefore, 
essentially trustworthy, they are invariably found to be, in point of fact, 
in essential agreement. They are, however, in essential agreement 
because they are trustworthy, but not trustworthy because in essential 
agreement. To frame parallel accounts that are essentially untrust- 
worthy and yet in essential, or even in perfect, agreement, is easy. 
The tendency of knaves, indeed, when fabricating well harmonized 
tales with a purpose, is to succeed only too well; for which reason there 
