164 THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 
the 4th applicative principle above established it is shown that these 
requisites so exemplified constitute prima facie evidence that the nar- 
rator had all the opportunities necessary in order to make his record 
trustworthy; and of these necessary opportunities, this especial one is the 
first and chief. While especial proof or discussion of this point is not 
necessary, it is, still, of interest to notice in the experimental test 
described in Section III a practical confirmation of the 4th applicative 
principle particularly in its relation to this question of nearness in time 
and place to the events narrated. In that test it was found not only 
that statements of individuals exemplifying the requisites for trust- 
worthiness are accepted as correct unless the contrary be proven, but 
also that the confidence so placed in these individuals was not associated 
with, nor limited to, statements concerning matters to which those 
individuals were personally near or with which they were closely related 
in time and place: on the contrary, the confidence was a general con- 
fidence, in so much that the persons to whom such an individual made 
a statement felt it necessary to believe, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, not only that any such statement was correct, but also 
that the individual either personally or through trustworthy channels 
had all the opportunities and all the access to information necessary 
in order to make his statement trustworthy; 1.e., scientifically expressed, 
the fact that he made the statement constituted for them prima facie 
evidence not only that the statement was correct or trustworthy, but 
also that he had either personally or through trustworthy media all 
the opportunities and all the access to information necessary in order 
to make it so. In point of fact any individual exemplifying the re- 
quisites for trustworthiness and the corresponding processes for formu- 
lating trustworthy statements, whether in verbal or written narrative, 
is ipso facto debarred from including in the narrative any thing of which 
he has not either personal knowledge as eye-witness or else information 
derived from sources which he is required as a reasonable man to regard 
as trustworthy; and this bar, which is contained in the very nature 
of the requisites by him manifestly exemplified, will be overstepped by 
him, if at all, only by inadvertent deviation from his own purpose. 
This purpose and his ability to carry it out, both of which are evinced 
by such exemplification, constitute prima facie evidence that the purpose 
actually was carried out; 1.e., unless the contrary be shown (and all 
that could possibly be shown to the contrary would be exceptional, 
inadvertent deviations from his purpose), one must believe that he 
included in his narrative only what he knew personally or drew from 
trustworthy sources. 
