[CRUIKSHANK] COMMAND OF LAKE ONTARIO, 1812-1813 201 
pursue the remainder as his flagship was plainly the only ship that had 
the least chance of overtaking the enemy’s vessels. 
Next morning Chauncey ordered two of his dullest sailing schoon- 
ers to anchor off Niagara under the protection of the batteries while the 
rest of his squadron ran into Genesee Bay and finding that the gale 
still continued, returned to Sackett’s Harbour where he took in pro- 
visions for five weeks. On his way down the lake, he met the Lady of 
the Lake, coming to rejoin him with fifty marines. 
“From what I have been able to discover of the movements of 
the enemy,” he wrote, disconsolately, “he has no intention of engaging 
except when he can get decidedly the advantage of wind and weather, 
and as his vessels in squadron sail better than our squadron, he can al- 
ways avoid unless I can gain the wind and have sufficient wind to 
bring him to action before dark. His object is evidently to harass 
me by night attacks by which means he thinks to cut off our small dull- 
sailing schooners in detail. Fortune has evidently favored him thus 
far. I hope it will be my turn next, and although inferior in point of 
force, I feel very confident of success.”1 
On the other hand Yeo wrote almost at the same time: 
“T feel confident that by watching every proper opportunity, 
we should get the better of him, but as long as he is determined to 
sacrifice everything to his own safety, I shall never in this narrow 
‘ water be able to bring the two ships to action, as I have no vessel 
that sails sufficiently well to second me. 
“This conduct he cannot persevere in long for his own honor as 
the loss of all his schooners, (which, I think, I must ever have in my 
power), will be an indelible disgrace, and I am at a loss to know how 
he will account to his government for it. 
“It concerns me much to find that I have such a wary opponent 
as it harasses me beyond my strength. Iam very unwell and I believe 
that nothing but the nature of the service keeps me up.’” 
Yet he had gained a real although unimportant advantage in a 
moral as well as in a material sense. To take two vessels from a 
superior fleet with his flagship alone, was, as Admiral Mahan remarks, 
a fine feat of seamanship. He had also discovered beyond doubt 
that prudence was his adversary’s predominent quality. This is 
incontestably proven by Chauncey’s instructions to Perry, written 
barely a month before. “The first object will be to destroy or cripple 
the enemy’s fleet;’’ he wrote, “but in all attempts upon the fleet 


1 Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, August 13. 
2 Yeo to Prevost, August 11, 1813. 
