212 THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 
“Under these circumstances will it be for the interests of the 
service that the American squadron should accompany the flotilla 
with the troops or shall it watch the British squadron, effect its destruc- 
tion and prevent the sudden transport of the division of the enemy by 
a rapid movement by water to reinforce Kingston ? 
“It strikes me that in the first case, the enemy, being apprised of 
our intentions, which cannot be concealed, may, with the aid of their 
squadron, reach Kingston before our troops are embodied and organ- 
ized for the attack, and thus the reduction of the place may be spun 
out to the consumption of the season, and of course the main design 
must fail. 
“In the second case while the American squadron blocks up that 
of the enemy at the head of the lake, the flotilla will enjoy a free sea 
and the British by being cut off from transport by water will be thrown 
back a month in their arrival at Kingston, long before which period 
the place must be taken and our army landed on Montreal island, 
no act of God intervening to thwart our intentions.””! 
In reply, Chauncey contented himself by remarking: 
“The reasons you assign in your memorandum why the American 
squadron should remain in this vicinity in preference to accompanying 
the flotilla down the lake are so conclusive and correspond so exactly 
with my own ideas and wishes upon the subject that I have no others 
to offer. I will barely observe that my best exertions shall be used to 
keep the enemy in check in this part of the lake or effect his destruction, 
yet with my utmost exertions and greatest vigilance, he may, (when 
favoured by a strong westerly wind), slip past me in the night and get 
eighteen or twenty hours the start of me down the lake before I can 
discover his movement. If that should be the case I shall lose no 
time in following with so much celerity as to prevent his interrupting 
you in your operation against Kingston.’” 
Wilkinson’s intentions were, however, partially disclosed to de 
Rottenburg by statements of deserters as early as September 28 and 
he sent off a message in post haste to warn the commandant 
at Kingston of the impending attack. ‘‘My ulterior movements must 
now depend on the issue of this action,” he said, “T am prepared to 
meet disaster with fortitude and assure Your Excellency that any 
retrograde movement I may be compelled to make shall be done de- 
liberately and without precipitation.’” 
Two days later he had received further information from other 
deserters that all the enemy’s troops of the line, except a single regi- 
1 Memorandum from Wilkinson for Chauncey, Fort George, Oct. 1. 
2 Chauncey to Wilkinson, off Niagara, Oct. 1. 
3’ De Rottenburg to Prevost, Four Mile Creek, Sept. 28. 
