234 THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 
The aphorism is one of Cleon’s: it belongs to his speech on the 
Mytilenaean question as reported by Thucydides himself (3. 37). 
The whole of the speech is along similar lines: a plea for common sense 
and practical prudence in dealing with enemies as against newfangled 
ideas of humanitarianism, or as against philosophic idealism or as 
against mere ingenious sophistry. The speech is extremely powerful 
as an indictment of Athenian humanitarianism, idealism, ingenuity 
and sophistry. It seems to me to be the best speech—I had almost said 
the best passage—in Thucydides, with the possible exception of the Fu- 
neral Speech. But that only makes it doubly difficult to gauge the 
relations of the speaker and the reporter of the speech. How comes it 
that Thucydides has reported so vigorous an expression of what we 
may call Tory-democracy, an expression by a democrat of the old 
Tory creed of horse-sense and common instinct and natural national- 
ism against fads, ideals and ’ologies of every kind ? and has supported 
it by an emphatic tribute to Nicias, the incarnation of old conventions 
(though not of democracy) and yet has no word of commendation 
for the speaker, but on the contrary has taken away hischaracter with 
posterity ? And all the more successfully and artistically because with 
so much self restraint, that no one before Grote suspected prejudice 
and unfairness and a personal grudge. 
No one supposes that Thucydides’ speeches are close reports of 
their originals: all the more difficult is it to understand the real force 
and eloquence of Cleon as reported. And there is a further contra- 
diction and mystification in this matter. Thucydides writes or re- 
ports, or writes partly and partly reports, Cleon’s protest against 
Athenian many-sidedness and susceptibility, Athenian idealism and 
scepticism; Cleon’s trenchant conclusion that democracy is an im- 
possible form of government for the conduct of foreign politics (for 
foreign politics must have continuity and principle, and democracy 
is the government of fits and starts, of snap votes and see-saw emotions) 
Thucydides goes out of his way—as though in order to supplement 
Cleon—to exalt the humdrum moderation of Nicias, and yet—per 
contva—he implicitly and explicitly condemns Cleon as a violent 
demagogue, despite the large element of Toryism common to Cleon 
with Nicias. Further, in his famous chapters of reflection (Bk. III, 
82-83) Thucydides laments the ill repute and unpopularity which by 
reason of the war came to be attached to academic thinkers, to the 
enlightened and the scrupulous and the best educated men in Athens. 
Owing to the war—he says—moderation came to be regarded as a 
mere excuse for cowardice and to know everything—people began to 
say—was to do nothing. 

