[CRUIKSHANK] HARRISON AND PROCTER 147 
This might be done, he said, with a comparatively small expenditure 
of money. He had nominally ten thousand men under his command; 
but of these not more than six thousand three hundred were reported 
fit for duty. With the most heroic efforts he had not succeeded in 
pushing the heads of his columns beyond Lower Sandusky, Fort Neces- 
sity and Fort Winchester. His artillery had arrived at Upper San- 
dusky on December 10th; but the teams drawing it, which had started 
in the best condition, were quite worn out. He was appalled at the 
loss of horses, valued at half a million dollars. Two trips from Fort 
McArthur to Winchester’s camp absolutely destroyed a brigade of pack- 
horses. The road had become a continuous morass, in which the horses 
sank to their knees and the waggons to the hubs of their wheels. The 
drivers were generally the dregs of the frontier settlements, who took 
little care of either horses or goods. The teams were valued so high 
that the owners were willing to sacrifice them to obtain compensation. 
Many waggons were abandoned and their contents lost. No bills of 
lading were used, nor accounts kept with the teamsters. The loss of 
public stores was enormous.’ Nothing could be more disheartening 
than the “imbecility and experience of public agents and the villainy 
of the contractors” upon whom his army was obliged to rely for their 
subsistence.” Every attempt to make use of the St. Mary and Au 
Glaize rivers for the conveyance of supplies had failed. 
Dr. Eustis, the Secretary of War, had been forced to resign by 
popular clamor. Monroe, the Secretary of State, undertook to ad- 
minister the affairs of that department until his successor was appointed. 
One of his first acts was to require Harrison “to form a clear and dis- 
tinct plan as to the objects you may deem attainable, and the force 
necessary for the purpose, and that you communicate the same with 
precision to this department.” He was cautioned at the same time 
not to promise the inhabitants of Canada anything beyond protection 
for their lives and property, and advised not to occupy any position 
which he would be unable to retain permanently. 
Before he received this letter, Harrison had actually written to 
suggest the postponement of further military operations until April 
and May, by which time a respectable naval force might be created 
upon Lake Erie. Detroit, he said, would not be tenable unless Am- 
herstburg was also taken. Otherwise he would be compelled to hide 
his army in the swamps to keep it out of range of the British artillery. 
Even if both these places were captured, his adversary might still re- 
tain Mackinac and St. Joseph’s Island as long as the Ottawa route 

McAfee, 183-4; Gardinier, Examiner. 
? Harrison to Secretary of War, 12 Dec., 1812. 
