[cruikshank] FROM ISLE AUX NOIX TO CHATEAUGUAY 61 



strictly on the defensive until he could be supported by the fleet. 

 Congress adjourned on August 2, doubtless much to the relief of the 

 cabinet who were then free to attempt the execution of their new plans 

 without being worried by embarrassing questions and hostile criticism. 

 Wilkinson had arrived a few days before. The proposed plan of 

 operations was submitted to him on the 5th and he gave his opinion 

 in writing next day formally approving of Sackett's Harbour as the 

 point of concentration but remarking that either operation would be 

 impracticable unless the fleet possessed the command of the lake 

 which had not yet been secured. He declared his great anxiety to 

 gain some initial success to inspirit the troops and "popularize the 

 war" and considered that this could be accomplished with more ease 

 and less loss in the vicinity of Niagara than anywhere else. Mean- 

 while he advised that the force at Burlington should be supplied 

 with a train of battering cannon and mortars to co-operate in the siege 

 of Montreal and that a strong force of volunteers and militia should 

 be assembled on the frontier of Lower Canada near Lake Memphrama- 

 gog with instructions to descend the St. Francis river and seize a 

 position on Lake St. Peter. He knew that General Hampton was 

 personally hostile to him and might not act with the necessary cordial- 

 ity and vigour in a combined movement. Probably it was this 

 apprehension that prompted him to ask for a copy of the instructions 

 already given to that officer and request that all orders should be issued 

 through him and that he might have power to detach from his command 

 "all persons who may manifest a temper or disposition to excite dis- 

 content, to generate factions, or embitter the service." 1 



Armstrong promptly and decisively rejected the proposal to 

 resume the offensive in the Niagara peninsula. 



"The main objection to any plan which shall carry our operations 

 wide of Kingston and westward of it, is that in the event of its success, 

 it leaves the strength of the enemy unbroken; it but wounds the tail 

 of the lion, and of course is not calculated to hasten the termination 

 of the war, either by increasing our own vigor or diminishing that of 

 the enemy. Kingston is the great depot of his resources and so long 

 as he retains this and keeps open his communication with the sea, 

 he will not want the means of multiplying his defences and renewing 

 the war in the west. 



"Kingston, therefore, as well on grounds of policy as of military 

 principle, presents the first and great object of the campaign." 2 



1 Wilkinson to Armstrong, Aug. 6, 1813. American State Papers, Military 

 Affairs, Vol. 1, pp. 463-4. 



2 Armstrong to Wilkinson, Aug. 8, Id., p. 465. 



