[cruikshank] FROM ISLE AUX NOIX TO CHATEAUGUAY 85 



The woods on the right of the position were pronounced im- 

 penetrable but the guides declared that a path or trail on the right 

 bank of the river would be found practicable for infantry and the ford 

 below was not only passable but weakly guarded as the work intended 

 for its protection was still unfinished. By combining a stealthy 

 turning movement along that route with a vigorous frontal attack, 

 the force occupying the advanced lines might be expelled or perhaps 

 cut off. 



The First Infantry Brigade, composed of the 4th, 33rd, 34th, and 

 35th Regiments of the United States Infantry, being considered the 

 most efficient portion of the division, was selected for the execution 

 of the turning operation. A detachment of the élite or picked 

 light troops was attached, making altogether a force of at least fifteen 

 hundred of all ranks. Colonel Purdy was placed in command and 

 instructed to cross the river at a ford near the mouth of the Outard. 

 To ensure surprise a night march of fifteen or sixteen miles, much 

 of the way along a narrow, winding and doubtful trail through dense 

 woods, was deemed necessary. The movement began at sunset. 

 Hampton accompanied the column as far as the ford. On returning 

 to his quarters at 9 p.m. he was astonished to find an officer awaiting 

 him with written instructions from the Quartermaster General to 

 select a site for the construction of huts as winter quarters for ten 

 thousand men at some suitable point on the Chateauguay river in 

 Lower Canada. Hampton afterwards declared that this document 

 "dashed his hopes" and raised such serious doubts in his mind of 

 receiving "that efficacious support that had been anticipated," that 

 he would have recalled Purdy had not the darkness and the progress he 

 had already made put it practically out of the question. It is now 

 known that the order upon which this letter was based was actually 

 written by the Secretary of War the day before Wilkinson's force 

 sailed from Henderson's Bay near Sackett's Harbour and three days 

 before that officer was permitted to abandon his movement against 

 Kingston and attack Montreal instead. Many years after, Armstrong 

 attempted to justify his conduct by saying that "from the lateness 

 of the season, the inclemency of the weather, and the continued 

 indisposition of the commanding general," he suspected that the cam- 

 paign would end as it did, "with the disgrace of doing nothing." 1 



It was still confidently expected that the turning force would 

 reach the ford below by daybreak and begin the attack as soon as it 

 was light enough to cross. The remainder of the division was accord- 

 ingly roused at a very early ho ur. It was then learned with some dismay 



1 Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1 ; McMaster, History of the People of the 

 United States, Vol. IV, 52. 



