Knowledge through our Senses. 455 



ot vibration that it must appeal, (Jirectly or indirectly, to whatever 

 senses we may happen to have. 



Our power c' simplifying and interpreting vibrations is ver\ 

 marvellous. For example, the phonograph has proved that not 

 merely the delicacies of a single voice or instrument, but the whole 

 of the noise of a brass band or the irregular shouting of a mob. can 

 be reduced to, and reproduced from, a single curve in two dimen- 

 sions, — the most astonishing mathematical fact, I think, that I have 

 hitherto been able to apprehend. Indeed, it is this that has given so 

 much hope to phenomenal jjsychology : knowledge has seemed more 

 and more reducible to sensation, sensation can more and more be 

 expressed in terms of vibration, and vibration has proved to be 

 measurable beyond the bounds of anticipation. It almost seemed 

 as if the world, material and mental, was all shortly to 1)6 summed up 

 in a mathematical formula. 



But when we take the other path, starting from consciousness 

 rather than from movemeiit, from within rather than from without, 

 things take on a very different aspect. It can be plausibly argued 

 that the only thing we really do knew first hand is our own conscious 

 existence; and that, so far from having tO' reduce our estimate of 

 ourselves to a passing combination of vibrations of unknown matter, 

 we cannot even be sure that vibrations outside of ourselves exist at 

 all. For what are we conscious of except modifications of our 

 mental being? And what warrant have we for objectifying our inner 

 experiences? Here, of course, we come to another coal-pit. Con- 

 sistent idealism is one of those theories which a man can onlv 

 believe while in his study chair, as Hume said. I will not quote the 

 common-sense of the vulgar against the reasonings of philosophers, 

 but I will say that idealism has shown itself tuo unreal to stand the 

 test r)f thoughtful life. 



The way out of the difficulty seems to lie, as I have already 

 hinted, in the direction of integration of processes which analysis is 

 always lending to differentiate. Our mental being is one through- 

 out, though it. and consequently every act of it. has a twofold aspect. 

 Perception, therefore, can be immediate, — that is, when I perceive, 

 it is not a mere mental picture of the thing, nor a mere mental modi- 

 fication of my own, that I perceive ; but in m\ own w a\ I i)ercei\e 

 the thing itself. One side of the i)erception can be analvsed into 

 material vilirations. and an(,>iher side into spiritual consciousness : 

 but l)oth analyses can l)e integrated into a single art. As the same 

 statement can be made about my very self, and as [ at least know 

 that I am real. I have very good reason for lieing i)hilosophicallv 

 sure that my perception is real also. 



It is obvious that in so short a paper I can .lo no more than 

 barely indicate the lines uf)on which my argument would ])roceed if 

 It were allowed <levelopment. I CMuId not hope to do more than 

 stimulate inquirv. and this perhaps the verv incomjileteness of mv 

 essav may help to d... If T seem to stop abrui.-tlv. let this be mv 

 excuse 



