Sociology of Comte. .171 



discuss, analyse, and measure the physical circumstances of the 

 mind, the essential fact must still be the mind, and not the brain. 

 On the other hand, had Comte not been so engrossed with physical 

 science that he forgot the existence of the mind, his Positi\"istic 

 tendencies would ha^e ensured his elaborating a truly scientific 

 method for his favourite science. 



Having closed the right road against himself, Comte attempts 

 to proceed by applying the general laws of physics bodily to the 

 facts of Sociology. Conformably with his decisi(m against abstract 

 methodology, he leaves the justification of this procedure a mere 

 assumption. It is, according to> Mr. Morley, the peculiarity of his 

 method in sociology that he verifies historical generalisations by 

 biological law as established. But what does this mean ? Science 

 can have no possible reason to verify its laws if its methods in attain- 

 ing those laws are legitimate. No other science submits its con- 

 clusions for the approval of a sister science. If two sciences do not 

 run in parallels, and if it is certain that they should run in parallels 

 — a point which Comte, as a consistent opponent of methodology 

 and upholder of a subjective synthesis which is not to be objective, 

 does not prove, n(jr give any reason for expecting- — then so much 

 the worse for one of the sciences. But we cannot be sure that the 

 older science is always right and the younger always wrong. 



However. Comte pursues his way undaunted. He finds, or 

 thinks he finds, in all human thought that there are three stages, the 

 theological, where we ascribe agency to an external cause ; the meta- 

 physical, where we ascribe it to abstract entities or causes ; and the 

 positive, where we trace the laws of phenomena, resigning ourselves 

 to ignorance of their agents. Each stage culminates in a unity, the 

 Theological in God, the Metaphysical in Nature, the Positive in the 

 subjective unity of man, and perhaps, if Lewes is to be trusted, in 

 the objective unity of the molecular theory. (618-9.) This being so, 

 the course of History must, willy nilly, be parallel; and on these 

 Procrustean parallels Comte proceeds tO' tortuic- ihe facts of the past 

 until they consent to divulge the secrets w'hich he desires them to 

 avouch — the three stages of human development, and the law of in- 

 <:reasing complexit)- and decreasing generality. Like one diseased, 

 Comte can see nothing but parallels. Lines which to the plain mind 

 appear toi cross each other appear to* him parallel. For instance, he 

 finds three parallel stages in all departments of history, that is, 

 since there are five stages in religion, namely, Fetichism, Polytheism, 

 Monotheism, Metaphysics, and Positivism, and two in human ideals, 

 namely, militarism and industrialism, we must transform the crosses 

 intO' parallels by simply calling them so. 



We can thus build up a sort of system out of the materials of 

 histor}". Toi complete the .systematisation of human knowledge we 

 require a system of systems, that is, a correlation of the separate 

 sciences. We have already seen the nature of Comte's synthesis. 

 He would be an agnostic if it ever occurred to him to ask what lies 

 behind phenomena. But it does not. There is nothing but 

 phenomena. The only absolute principle is that all is relative (Pol. 



