472 Report S.A.A. Advancement of Science. 



Ap. Pref. ]I. From essay of 1817.) — that is, apparently, merely 

 phenomenal. The only unity, therefore, is the subject regarded as 

 essentially distinct from the object of knowledge. As Mr. vSpencer 

 says, Comte worships the finite as the infinite. On his own princi- 

 ples he had no right to make a unity of the subject — that is, man, 

 as this is ascribing unity to the race without the warrant of anything 

 but the ideological facts which he denies. Having, b}- a happy in- 

 consistenc). arrived at this unity, he seeks to transfer to it all the 

 worship which is habitually paid to God as Creator, though he ad- 

 mits that Humanity is not the creator. Mr. Spencer identifies his 

 unknowable with the unity of Theology and the unity of Metaphysics, 

 and says that it is the true unity of Positivism and Science. He is 

 too rational to worship a concrete finite. Comte is too rational to 

 worship an abstract infinite, and stops at the very point where his 

 own principles are compelling him to hypostatize it. 



Perhaps this review has been unduly summary. But the fact is 

 that it is a matter of little moment whether Comte was right or wrong 

 in his reading of histor). The law of the three stages is of 

 extremely little value to sociologists, even if it can be substantiated. 

 The whole system of Comte's sociology has to be dissolved before 

 its elements can be utilised at all. But it is worth while observing 

 certain further prejudices and limitations in Comte's mind which are 

 reflected in his particular opinions, and which help to make plain 

 the nature of his error. First, Comte was not a scientific evolu- 

 tionist like Darwin, nor a philosophical evolutionist like St. Paul 

 and Hegel, and in consequence he had a mechanical view of 

 development, and regarded species as absolutely distinct, and, on 

 the other hand, stages in human growth as differing in experience, 

 but not in mental power. So, for instance, he accounts for the 

 alleged smallness of the number of great names in Polytheistic 

 periods b) the mutual jealousies of the priests of different gods. 

 (Cat. 341.) This tendency naturally leads to a psychology based on 

 a childish faith in phrenolog), and characterised by the most abso- 

 lute distinction of elements. The mind is almost passive in percep- 

 tion. As in PlatO', the three chief classes in the State correspond tc 

 the three divisions of the mind, as if these had an independen 

 existence. There is nO' development of the impersonal from the per- 

 sonal instincts, and therefore maternal lo\e is classed as purely 

 egoistic. Hence the strain of asceticism in Comte. despite his 

 theoretical objections to anything of the kind. Secondly, Comte 

 certainlv had an inordinate affection for system. He likes threes, 

 and therefore makes the relations of mother, wife, and daughter the 

 only fundamental female relations, sisterhood being negligible as 

 not exciting anv special emotion. But, in arranging his months, he 

 finds that there are four weeks, and sisterhood therefore reasserts 

 itself. (Cat. 107, iio. and 131.) We need not multiply instances. 

 There is an appearance of exactness about Comte's arrangements 

 which is purely fallacious. For instance, he calculates the precise 

 salaries of the priesthood without pausing to consider what effects 

 the general arrangements would have on the value of money. He 



