414 A SCHOLASTIC VIEW OF TIME. 



which we signify by saying that things happen before a certain 

 instant or after it. 



But though it is true that the present moment enables us 

 to divide time into present, past and future, it is also true that 

 the moment establishes the continuity oi time. * In the same 

 way it causes us to realise two other i^roperties of time, z'ic, 

 that it is quantitive and divisible. Now these three qualities 

 are common to extension, motion and time. And since movement 

 follows a line of some sort, since time follows movement, their 

 measurements riui parallel to one another. t Hence we measure 

 movement by its extension, and time and motion in terms of 

 one another. And for an instinctive tribute to the truth of the 

 last statement, you need only remember that when you want to 

 measure the flight of time, you look at the progress made by 

 the hands of the clock. These preliminaries elucidate Aris- 

 totle's definition of time : " It is the measure of motion in its 

 aspect of duration"' (not a literal translation, but a fair para- 

 phrase of his words) : apiOfxoi; Kiin)(Teu><; Kara ro irporepov KaX 

 varepov. Experience teaches us that time disappears where 

 there is no consciousness of movement, yet it is not movement 

 itself ; but whenever the mind discovers one thing living or 

 moving before another, it becomes conscious of time. 



Upon this foundation of .\ristotle the two scholastic 

 treatises mentioned build a fuller and more consistent theory of 

 time. Much of what Aristotle has written is obscure, because 

 of the imperfect way in which his lectures were taken down 

 and preserved ; but .some of the obscurity is doubtless due to a 

 want of development of the subject. This is fully atoned for 

 by Aquinas in his exposition of the nature of time, which is a 

 model of clarity and straight reasoning. 



The monograph " De Tem]X)re " has four chapters, in the 

 first of which it is shewn that time is something real, though 

 not an indeijendent, self-sufficing entitw The second chapter 

 is that which adheres most closely to Aristotle, whilst it puts 

 greater logical secfuence into the ideas scattered here and there 

 •by the Master. Time is not movement (is the burden of this 

 chapter), but is dependent upon it and a measure of it. The 

 third chapter discusses what things are measured by time and 

 what not — movement first of all, and other things, in as far as 

 they partake of movement or are related to it. 



Amongst the realities which are abo\e time, as we know 

 it, come the separated substances and the First Cause of all 

 things. Here Af|uinas dei>arts a good fleal from the conclusions 

 of Aristotle, but he is at pains tr» sliew that the Scholastic 

 theories of his day are in com])lete accord with the general and 

 fundamental jiositions of the Philosopher; whilst time (lie holds) 



* Kal crvv€')(r)<i re Btj '^^povos tcG vvv kol Bi-pprjTai Kara to 

 vvv (ch. xi., g). 



^ d/coXovOel yap t<x> p,€v /xeyeOei >) Kivijai^, rrf Se KiifjcreL 6 

 "X^poi'o^, ru> Kal TTocra Kai rTVve)(>) Kal Siaipera elvai. I c\\. xii., 6). 



