A SCIIor. ASTIC VIKW OI' TI M K. 415 



as defined by Aristotle is the proper measure of the duration of 

 all things which are subject to generation and corruption, it 

 cannot be the apidixos of existences on a higher level. JEvum 

 and eternity are the measures which express ( as far as expres- 

 sion is possible in our terms) the duration of separated beings 

 and the First Cause. 



Here he carefully distinguishes at least two kinds of eter- 

 nity — that which is mere time without beginning or end. and 

 that which is " unitas rei ?eternie." Elsewhere he contends that 

 the eternity of the created universe is concei\al)le. and would 

 not amount to a contradiction of its dependence upon a First 

 Cause. The eternity of the latter is totally different in kind, 

 and he describes it in the words of Bioethius : " 'Eternitas est 

 interminabilis vit?e tota simul et perfecta possessio." 



The treatise '' De Instantibus " carries the discussion a bit 

 further in its five chapters. The second and third chapters 

 pursue the fleeting to vvv through all its peregrinations, and are 

 the most thorough discussion of the subject that we have any- 

 where. The other three chapters are most interesting, because 

 they shew how the Scholastics were able to use Greek philosophy 

 in expounding the scientific bearing of many facts of the Chris- 

 tian Revelation. 



What Aristotle called the separated substances Christian 

 tradition called Angels. But whereas Aristotle only glanced at 

 these, it was necessary for a Christian philosopher to say a great 

 deal about beings which figure so prominently in the Old and 

 New Testament. Hence the need of expanding the teaching of 

 the Greek, and of applying it to these new facts. I shall now 

 endeavour to shew how he sets about this task in regard to 

 time. 



In the separated substances (which the Christian Revela- 

 tion calls Angels) there is not the material succession* which 

 is the basis of all time measurement with which we are ac- 

 quainted. But since they can apprehend ideas in succession, 

 there must be some means of measuring this duration of suc- 

 cessive acts of their minds. 



There is, therefore, a prins ct posterius in the intellectual 

 acts of separated substances, but it is not continuous, but dis- 

 crete, if that term can be applied to a series which is not quan- 

 titative at all. Hence, whatever be the nature of the " time " 

 which measures the successive operations of the angelic intelli- 

 gence, it is composed of indivisible imits. Let us imagine a 

 number com]X)sed of successive units, each of which is indivisi- 

 ble because not quantitative. 



A closer comparison with our own time will elucidate this. 

 Time is called a number by .\ristotle. because it is the means 

 of enumerating the length of the duration of a motion. But 

 if our time is a continuous quantity always, this is because it 

 measures a material succession which is continuous. But the 



* Aquinas, " Opuscula," vol. i., p. 350. 



