4l8 A SCHOLASTIC VIEW OF TIME. 



He assumes that causation, though continuous, has n(j duration, 

 or, in other words, that for a tinite cause to produce a finite 

 effect no time is rec|uired ; whereas, in fact, all causal action is 

 a orradual process which may occupy a considerable period of 

 time." "" In some ideal world, or in some actual world more per- 

 fect than any of which we know by direct ex])erience. all this 

 may be so. 



But in the real world, which is the rough material out of 

 which we hew our si)eculative knowledge, the case is very dif- 

 ferent. Duration, and consequently time, are physical conditions 

 of growth and evolution. Geological formations, animal varia- 

 tions, great political developments, are really tied to time for 

 their results. The lapse of time is a real condition which gives 

 the agents at work a necessary aid to their action. Time alone 

 neither makes nor mars ; but in many instances we perceive that 

 all the other causes together will not produce a desired effect, if 

 this reality be wanting. Who wall doubt to-day that time is a 

 real element of military preparedness? 



Bergson is at once the most recent and the m(i>t thorough 

 opix)nent of the reality of time. There is indeed a kind of time, 

 which he asserts to be the very essence of life and the whole 

 meaning of realit)'. P>ut as this is a metaphor, we need not stop 

 to consider it. 



Time, as science concei\es it, d(jes not form j^art of the 

 reality of material things: this is the Bergsonian proposition 

 wihich really concerns us. it is so startling that one can only 

 look for the reasons that are supposed to support it. 



In the first place. Bergson asks us to reject the idea oi a 

 real time in relation t<; ordinary unorganised material things 

 because whatever happens to them they remain substantially the 

 same. In other words, time does not affect any substantial 

 change. This is not alwa\s trtte, as we see when the diamond 

 emerges from the ground, produced by many geological adven- 

 tures in a long time from baser materials. 



But even if time never worked a substantial change, that 

 would not demolish its reality; for not all reality is made up of 

 substantial dilterences. There are minor differences between 

 things which often escape our observation because of the very 

 incompleteness of their being. These are " c|uae mininiam enti- 

 tatem habent," according to .\(|uiuas in the \er\- first chapter 

 of his work " l)e 'rem|)i)re."' linie has a kind of parasitic exis- 

 tence, in so far as it cannot l)c conceived as standing alone, 

 a]jart from the things which are measured by time. .\ i)artialh- 

 elusive existence it does lead, and it re((uire> logical reflexion ti> 

 define its nature. \\'hil>i. there fore, we can admit with Bergst)n 

 that time doe> not ])o>sc-ss the most substantial kind of being, 

 nor the most ol)\ious. these properties may make time- an incom- 

 |)letc reality, but they do nt)t destroy the reality of it. 



.\gain Bergson takes up the paral)le by admitting that there 

 is .semething which looks like reality in time, but it is a creature 



* I'k-m. p. 372. 



