AUG 16 1894 



NATURAL SCIENCE: 



A Monthly Review of Scientific Progress. 



No. 30. Vol. V. AUGUST. 1894. 



NOTES AND COMMENTS. 



Vox POPULI. 



WHATEVER Mr. Arthur J. Balfour says is interesting, whether 

 one agrees with it or not, and most people will therefore have 

 read the remarks that he made when he took the chair at a recent 

 lecture by Professor J. Shield Nicholson. One of Mr. Balfour's 

 points was the necessity for a separation between science and popular 

 opinion. Questions of science cannot be decided by universal suf- 

 frage. Science must be allowed free play and room for growth 

 altogether outside the influence of popular forces. Science must be 

 kept from the vulgar, and the vulgar must be kept from science. 



Looking at things, as is his wont, through the clear and rarefied 

 air of philosophy, Mr. Balfour could not fail to apprehend the essential 

 distinction that must always exist between the intellectuality of 

 scientific investigation and the sentiment of popular feeling ; he could 

 not fail to discriminate between the attitude of mind that pursues 

 knowledge for its own sake, sacrificing the most cherished convictions 

 of the multitude on the altar of a severe truth, and that very opposite 

 spirit which views all things through the distorting glasses of utili- 

 tarianism, seeking always for some advantage either in this world or in 

 that which is to come. Now these two modes of approaching Nature 

 are so distinct that it is quite impossible to unite them. Each is 

 bound to live and move independent of the other. So far, then, as 

 Science is concerned, we do not think that the public will ever spoil 

 her investigations. Mr. Balfour's warning is therefore not required. 



When, however, we look at things from a somewhat more 

 practical standpoint, we shall discover many advantages that may 

 accrue to both parties from the promotion of a closer alliance between 

 the two than Mr. Balfour seems to favour. Not merely need we 

 have no fear of injuring Science, but we may even gain for her some 

 additional powers. Scientific men have, or ought to have, a wise 

 diffidence in the stability of their own theories ; perceiving how far 



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