380 NATURAL SCIENCE [December 
occurred “the formation of molecules more and more heterogeneous.” 
The inference which may fairly be drawn is, that the properties of 
living substance are the resultants of the properties of its components. 
But at first sight this does not seem to square well with the asser- 
tion that “the processes which go on in living things are incompre- 
hensible as the results of any physical actions known to us.” One 
can picture how certain folk will gloat and “ chortle in their joy” 
over this confession, for such it will almost inevitably be regarded. 
But it is not likely that Mr Spencer is here, in so vital a matter, 
false to the evolution he has done so much to elucidate. The two 
seemingly contradictory statements are not really contradictory ; they 
are made in different connections; the one in reference to pheno- 
menal causation, the other to noumenal causation—to an underlying 
“ principle of activity.” 
The simple statement of fact is that the phenomena of life are 
data suc generis, and must as such be accepted by science. Just as 
when oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water, new data for 
science emerge, so, when protoplasm was evolved, new data emerged 
which it is the business of science to study. In both cases we 
believe that the results are due to the operation of natural laws, that 
is to say, can, with adequate knowledge, be described in terms of 
antecedence and sequence. But in both cases the results, which we 
endeavour thus to formulate, are the outcome of principles of activity, 
the mode of operation of which is inexplicable. We formulate the 
laws of evolution in terms of antecedence and sequence; we also 
refer these laws to an underlying cause the noumenal mode of action 
of which is inexplicable. This, if I interpret him rightly, is Mr 
Spencer’s meaning. ‘ 
The use of the phrase ‘dynamic element in life’ is also open 
to misconstruction. A dynamic element, as understood by science, 
is a link in the phenomenal chain, and is expressed in terms of 
the inter-relation of the parts of a material system, and of actu- 
ally observed attractions and repulsions. But it is customary for 
physicists to introduce at the outset of their discourse detinitions 
of force as the cause or raison d’étre of motion. These are now com- 
monly regarded as a pious tribute to the noumenal, like grace before 
meat, and independent of physics in its strictly scientific aspect. 
But since such a definition of force not infrequently stands in the 
fore front of a treatise on dynamics, it may be regarded, noumenal 
though it be, as a dynamical postulate. It is in this noumenal sense 
that the term ‘dynamic’ is used in Mr Spencer’s phrase. It is, 
we are told, a “ principle of activity.” And unless the reader is 
careful to note the distinction, Mr Spencer’s position will be open 
to misconstruction. Vitalism is a philosophical conception; and 
the controversy which is suggested by the term is largely due to the 
