IV. 



On the Relation of Philosophy to Natural 



Science.' 



IN explanation of the above title, I may mention that a prize for the 

 best essay on the subject was offered by the Philosophical 

 Society of Berlin in i8gi. The question not being personal, but 

 purely scientific, is, however, open to independent enquirers at any 

 time. 



Some forty years ago Mr. Herbert Spencer commenced a 

 " System of Synthetic Philosophy," and in a comparatively modern 

 edition (the fifth, 1887) of the " First Principles," chapter i., part ii., 

 p. 127, under the heading " Philosophy Defined," he has done good 

 service in attempting to give a definition of Philosophy. After some 

 preliminary remarks, he says : — 



" The truths of philosophy thus bear the same relation to the 

 highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower scientific 

 truths. As each widest generalisation of science comprehends and 

 consolidates the narrower generalisations of its own division, so the 

 generalisations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest 

 generalisations of science. It is, therefore, a knowledge the extreme 

 opposite in kind to that which experience first accumulates. It is 

 the final product of that process which begins with a mere colligation 

 of crude observations, goes on establishing propositions that are 

 broader and more separated from particular cases, and ends in 

 universal propositions. Or to bring the definition to its simplest and 

 clearest form, Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge ; 

 science is partially unified knowledge ; Philosophy is completely 

 unified knowledge." (" First Principles," pp. 133, 134.) 



According to this definition, it appears that philosophy purports 

 to be a development of science up to complete unification ; or that a 

 system of philosophy is understood to include science as an integral 

 part of itself; and, therefore, the relation of philosophy to science 

 simply represents the relation of knowledge completely unified to 

 knowledge partially unified. It appears, then, that the answer to the 

 prize essay in question is given in these few words, in terms of Mr. 

 Spencer's definition of philosophy. 



Certain fundamental intuitions, Mr. Spencer remarks, that are 



1 " Das Verhaltniss der Philosophie zu dem empirischen Wissenschaft von der 

 Katur." 



