1895. RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO SCIENCE. 255 



teaches that processes take place according to natural laws. Although 

 the broad and general terms in which the above formula is worded 

 may make its precise application to detail a thing scarcely to be 

 expected, it may none the less be viewed as a valuable contribution 

 to the coordination of the procedure of natural processes, where we 

 should otherwise be left in the dark. That the author also uses his 

 formula as an aid to organise, classify, and integrate the subdivisions 

 of his works into a coherent system is manifest, philosophy being a 

 super-organic product in a certain sense " evolved." 



How is it, it may be asked, that while the formula of evolution 

 implies that heterogeneity or complexity is a concomitant of progress, 

 nevertheless in the invention of machinery, simplicity and not com- 

 plexity is made the object of study ? Here at least simplification is 

 one phase of progress, and simplicity being unique of its kind, is 

 not easy to discover. 



An analysis may, however, remove this apparent contradiction. 

 A modern machine, such as a locomotive or a steamship, is more 

 complex or heterogeneous than that of an older type ; not, however, 

 that simplification is less studied than formerly, but that the machine 

 has to fulfil additional functions, for which, of course, additional 

 mechanism is required. It does not, however, follow that the 

 mechanism itself is wanting in simplicity, or that the simplicity 

 aimed at has not been gained. The complexity or heterogeneity here 

 consists in the variety of machines, some subsidiary, not in the 

 complication of any particular piece of mechanism. In fact any 

 suggestion for simplifying the mechanism is always welcomed. 

 Machines, like the higher animals, have advanced in heterogeneity on 

 account of the multiplication of the separate functions attendant on a 

 higher degree of civilisation. Hence it appears that the formula of 

 evolution applies, provided all the conditions are allowed for. 



Referring to the proposed definition of philosophy, Mr. Spencer 

 observes : — " Science means merely the family of the sciences — stands 

 for nothing more than the sum of knowledge formed of their contribu- 

 tions ; and ignores the knowledge constituted by the fusion of all these 

 contributions into a whole. As usage has defined it, science consists 

 of truths existing more or less separated, and does not recognise these 

 truths as entirely integrated." (" First Principles," p. 132.) 



This seems to imply that although between philosophy and 

 science no sharp line of demarcation exists, yet the distinctive name 

 " Philosophy " is convenient for indicating the contents of a volume 

 bearing that title. If the volume form part of a " System of 

 Philosophy," it will constitute a unit in a collective treatise, whose 

 main object is the complete unification of the knowledge partially 

 unified by science ; the more abstract reasoning required for extreme 

 generalisation tending to become a specialised field of investigation, 

 even if the method involved be the same as in science. 



This pursuit of scientific investigation under a different name. 



