.8^. THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. 307 



writer, 2 that the consciousness that we know has been developed 

 from something which is of the same nature as consciousness, but 

 which has not yet risen to the level of consciousness. This infra- 

 consciousness I hold to be associated with all forms of energy. Only 

 when the manifestations of energy reach the complexity of the mole- 

 cular vibration in nerve-centres does the infra-consciousness rise to 

 the level of consciousness. Mr. Pearson suggests that we might as 

 well say that there is in matter " something-which-is-not-yet-life-but- 

 which-may-develop-into-life " and call it supennateriality . He has, 

 however, I venture to think, missed the point of my contention. He 

 objects that there is no sense-impression of such infra-consciousness. 

 Of course not. I hold with most philosophers that consciousness is 

 something of a wholly different kind from the energy through which 

 we receive sense-impressions. If Professor Pearson holds that some 

 mode of material existence or of energy has been developed into 

 consciousness, let him adduce some satisfactory, or at least plausible, 

 grounds for this belief. If not, let him tell us from what it has 

 developed. Either consciousness has been reached by a process of 

 mental evolution, or it has been specially created. Mr. Pearson will 

 not, I take it, adopt the latter alternative. But if he accepts the 

 former, I would ask him to inform us from what it has been developed. 

 I venture to think that the conception of infra-consciousness co- 

 extensive with energy is arrived at by the application of principles 

 laid down by Mr. Pearson himself, namely, the carrying to a con- 

 ceptual limit of that which is suggested in the sphere of the per- 

 ceptual and ejective world. In any case, the analogy with life is 

 beside the mark ; for I hold with Professor Pearson that the dis- 

 tinction between the inorganic and the organic cannot be defined by 

 saying that the one is mechanical and the other is not. From the 

 inorganic to the organic we can conceivably pass by successive 

 advances in complexity of structure and of associated modes of energy ; 

 but by no such advances can we conceivably reach consciousness, if, 

 as I hold, consciousness is not mechanical, and is neither a mode of 

 matter nor of energy. From what, then, has consciousness been 

 evolved, if not from infra-consciousness associated with lower modes 

 of energy ? 



In conclusion (for we must pass over the last chapter, on The 

 Classification of the Sciences, without comment) I may say that the 

 problems discussed with great ability and lucidity, and often in a 

 most suggestive manner, by Professor Pearson, are such as should 

 interest all students of natural science. Modern biology and geology 

 are full of physical problems, and the students of these sciences must 

 have some acquaintance with such physical conceptions as Mr. 

 Pearson discusses. They should also have some acquaintance with 

 the wider problems of the general philosophy of science. The central 



2 Animal Life and Intelligence, p. 467, and more recently in ih&Monist for January, 

 1892. 



X 2 



