,8^. THE '^ GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE.'' 455 



technical purposes of actual physical science. Here, if anywhere, 

 comment and criticism were to be hoped for. But our hopes are 

 doomed to disappointment. All we get from Professor Lloyd 

 Morgan is the following : — 



" The question is whether, given certain sense impressions which 

 suggest the percept clock, there are any objective relationships which 

 I can describe by using the adjectives distant, extended, and suc- 

 cessive." 



Now it is almost incredible that one who has carefully read 

 Professor Pearson's earlier chapters, and who may also fairly be 

 supposed to be not wholly unacquainted with the writings of Kant, 

 should really for a moment suppose that this is the question. The 

 real question, of course, is not whether there are any relations of 

 objects which may be so described, but what it is in truth which we 

 are stating when we make use of these terms of relationship. The 

 adjective "objective " (which Professor Pearson has happily avoided 

 in his chapter on " Space and Time "), it is almost needless to say, 

 settles nothing. But to Professor Lloyd Morgan the blessed words 

 " objective," " frankly objective," and " objective existence " (without 

 a hint of further definition), seem to be conclusive shibboleths as to 

 the great problems upon which Berkeley, Hume, and Kant spent the 

 best working hours of their lives. 



What does Professor Lloyd Morgan mean by "objective 

 relationships " ? Does he mean that they have an existence, as 

 such, in the absence of the percipient mind ? This he expressly 

 denies. Does he mean a relationship between objects ? No one 

 has denied objective relationships in this sense, and Professor 

 Pearson on his part declares, " Space has no existence if objects 

 are withdrawn." 



It would seem that what Professor Lloyd Morgan means by 

 " objectivity " is "empirical reality." In other words, just as Dr. 

 Johnson supposed that Berkeley's views on Matter must lead men to 

 run their heads against brick walls, so Professor Lloyd Morgan has 

 forgotten that human experience is none the less real, either as to 

 weight or measure, even if it can be shown that the terms which 

 express that experience owe all their significance to their inseparable 

 association with the nature of our perceptive faculty. 



Physics, no doubt, is wise, as Professor Lloyd Morgan remarks, 

 in dealing with space and time in frankly objective terms. This 

 Professor Pearson has not disputed, at least in any intelligible sense 

 of that phrase. What he has disputed is the conventional, or 

 uncritical view, which takes space and time for " things," instead 

 of taking them for an order of things, and which supposes that bodies 

 are capable of being philosophically dealt with as if they had a 

 " reality " not conditioned by the nature of our faculties for knowing 

 them. 



Moreover, whether true or not, all this is to Professor Lloyd 



