.8,,. THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE. 499 



For myself, I am absolutely convinced (after wandering for years 

 in the mazes of Idealism) that we do know vastly more. The " sense- 

 impressions" and "sense-impresses" arouse the intellect to much more 

 than their own recognition, association, &c., &c. ; they arouse it to 

 the direct perception of external objects — of things-in-themselves — 

 though not, of course, to an exhaustive knowledge of them. It is 

 evident to me that, in Mr. Ryle's words, " they have a ' reality ' not 

 conditioned by the nature of my faculties for knowing them." 



That the knowledge of the numerical relation of things — that the 

 facts concerning their number {e.g., that oranges on a plate are three and 

 not five) are real and absolute, and not conditioned by my faculties, 

 is, for me, unquestionable. I am also convinced that I have an 

 intuition of the extension of extended things. Dr. Johnson's often- 

 ridiculed kick at a stone by way of refuting Idealism, was most 

 probably a mute affirmation of his consciousness of this intuition, and 

 his recognition that a synthesis of "sensations" and "sense-impresses" 

 is quite inadequate to account for our perception of an external body 

 or of our own body.'° 



But though I am convinced I know the before-enumerated four 

 truths, and the existence, figure, and numerical relations of extended 

 things, I do not know how I know such things. This, however, is an 

 ignorance of small consequence, and an analogous ignorance is abso- 

 lutely inevitable, whatever theory of knowledge or philosophical 

 system we may adopt. 



Messrs. Ryle and Pearson, and their masters and pastors — i.e., the 

 " sensists " — are in the very same difficulty with the Intellectualists. 

 How it comes about that their organisation is endowed with the power 

 of having " sense-impressions " and " sense-impresses " — how the 

 stimulation of a nerve and brain can result in a feeling — it is absolutely 

 impossible for them to say. They do not, however, on this account 

 doubt their possession of them, or the truth of their persuasion to that 

 effect. Neither does the inability of the Intellectualist to say how it 

 comes about that on the occurrence of the necessary conditions he 

 perceives a material body, a thought, or an abstract necessary truth, 

 in the least cause him to doubt a thing which is to him evidently true. 

 Our feelings are but the means, not the object of perception." 



However great our knowledge, we must, unless we have recourse 

 to a regressus ad infinitum, always arrive at ultimate cognitions — that is, 

 at facts we cannot explain ; and it is no greater difficulty or 

 absurdity to recognise that we have " intellectual perceptions " 

 which are ultimate and inexplicable, than that we have " feelings" 

 which are ultimate and inexplicable ; moreover, there cannot possibly 

 be any further test of truths so self-evident. '^ Ultimate truths must 

 contain their own evidence. 



I'* As to this consult On Truth, pp. 90-96. 



" Op. cit., pp. 90 and 91. 12 gp^ cit., pp. 10-14. 



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