500 NATURAL SCIENCE. s^p^.. 



Mr. Ryle, in speaking of Space and Time as represented in the 

 Grammar, says that what Mr. Pearson " has disputed is the conven- 

 tional, or uncritical view, that takes space and time for ' things,' 

 instead of taking them for an order of things." But, in fact, 

 they are neither the one nor the other. One "order of things" is 

 Extension, that is, many things are extended, and extension is an 

 abstract idea and term denoting the extended nature of such things, 

 which nature is a reality and real condition of the things referred 

 to. Space, however, is not extension, but is altogether ideal, 

 an abstraction from abstractions, and is nothing but a conception of 

 the extension of all extended things. It is the abstract idea of their 

 common extension and mutual exclusion. ^3 Similarly, succession is 

 another "order of things," i.e., many things succeed one after 

 the other. Succession is an abstract idea and term denoting the 

 succession of things which succeed. It is, therefore, real as a quality 

 of succeeding things. But Time is not succession — it is altogether 

 ideal, and again (like Time) is an abstraction from abstractions, and 

 nothing but a conception of the succession of all succeeding things. ^+ 



This comprehension of the meaning of the terms time and 

 space, accompanied with a recognition that we can intue succession 

 as well as extension, and that the four truths earlier enumerated are 

 true, furnishes us with a secure basis upon which the whole series of 

 sciences, from Mathematics to Philosophy, can progress in harmonious 

 self-consistency. 



But there is another truth, the clear perception of which has a 

 special relation to that department of " Natural Science" which we 

 distinguish as Biology. For we know most intimately by and in our 

 own consciousness, something — our own intellect — which exists con- 

 tinuously, which is conscious of successive objects and events, and 

 which, itself transcending them, can recognise them as forming a 

 series which it can contemplate as a whole or in parts, and in 

 different orders, according as may be desired. This power or 

 principle it also knows with perfect certainty can and does know 

 itself, is aware of the kinds and directions of its activities, and can 

 regard them as a whole, or in groups, or singly. It can, it well 

 knows, perceive its own states, both passive and active, and also 

 external objects and events, and can compare the relations between 

 them, returning upon itself at will along different lines of thought, 

 and also setting forth in various directions at will. Such a power, 

 aware of all these things, and present to them all, cannot itself be 

 multitudinous, but must be as much a unity as anything we can think 

 of. It is also evident and certain, therefore, that this principle is 

 neither a material substance nor a physical force, but presents the 

 greatest contrast to both, and the greatest contrast to what is 

 material is what is immaterial. Also, since each man knows that it 



^^ Op. cit., pp. 407-409. " Op. cit., pp. 409-410. 



