72 Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology. 



Metaphysics in Comparative Psychology.' 



The first of these articles is a defence of the comi)arative method 

 in psychology in general, but more particularly when based upon an 

 identity theory of the relation of brain and consciousness. He criti- 

 cizes that school of comparative psychologists which attempts to reduce 

 all forms of aniiiial reactions to the type of mechanical tropfsms, assert- 

 ing that this tendency toward a mechanical interpretation is the direct 

 product of false metaphysical assumption — that of psychophysical par- 

 allelism. Instead of this, the author upholds a theory of identity 

 which makes it possible for him to put "Seele" in parenthesis after 

 "Gehirn." 



The arguments with which he attacks the parallelistic doctrine are 

 familiar enough and will perhaps pass muster ; at least they are the usual 

 arguments wielded in current controversy. On a parallelistic hypo- 

 thesis, when the one series is complex, the other should be complex, 

 and vice versa : but this is not the case. The psychical sequence, 

 which, on the parallelistic theory, ought to form a continuous whole is 

 arbitrarily broken without any assignable cause, or the psychological 

 causes which are assigned prove, on closer inspection, to be inadequate. 

 Both of these arguments, in the opinion of the reviewer, can be met 

 by the parallelist. But let it pass. More important for criticism are 

 the positive arguments brought forward in support of the identity 

 doctrine. 



The author points out that there are important brain centers which 

 are inaccessible to present physiological experimentation and which 

 seem to bear no direct relation to our ordinary consciousness. Con- 

 sciousness corresponds to a comparatively limited phase of cerebral 

 activity. Indirectly, however, the content of consciousness is influ- 

 enced to a high degree by the activities of these centers. It is not 

 astonishing, therefore, that the psychophysical law does not hold. 

 (He does not say so, but presumably this is because of the inhibitory 

 effect of competing stimuli originating in these centers.) 



Instead of regarding this as evidence simply of an unsuspected 

 complexity in the conditions of that shifting area of tension which con- 



'A. FoREL. Die Berechtig'ing der vergleichenden Psychologic und ihre 

 Objekte. [ournal filr Psycholo_s:ie und Neurologie, Band I, Heft i und 2, pp. 

 3-10 (1902); Beispiele phylogenetischer Wirkungen und Riickwirkungen bei den 

 Instinkten und dem Korperbau der Ameisen als Belege fiir die Evolutionslehre 

 und die psychophysiologisciie IdentitJitslehre. Ibid., Band I, Heft 3, pp. 99- 

 110(1902); Ants and Some Other Insects, Mom'st, Vol. XIV, No. i. Oct. 

 1903 ; Jan. 1904. Tr. by W. M. Wheeler. 



