422 Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology. 



uected statement of the author's own position, which must, therefore, 

 be assembled to a large extent from the critical portion of the work. 



Professor Strong classifies the theories, in so far as they are em- 

 pirical, into 



I. Interactionism : Psychophysical dualism and Psychophysical 

 phenomenalism (interactionist type). 



II. Automatism: Psychophysical materialism and Psychophys- 

 ical phenomenalism (automatist type). 



III. Parallelism : Psychophysical monism and Ps^ychophysical 

 idealism (the last being the author's position). 



By the title chosen the author intentionally prepares his reader 

 for the panpsychist view advocated, as he explains in the preface. For 

 his theory he claims that "its difficulties are of the nature of obscuri- 

 ties, not of contradictions. Hence I think that panpsychists are justi- 

 fied in maintaining that with their principles they are able to explain 

 the connection of mind and body." The author hopefully proposes 

 "a settlement of the controversy between the parallelists and the inter- 

 actionists," a hope which we fear few of his readers will be able to 

 share. 



The problem for the author, resolves itself into an "issue between 

 interactionism and automatism, the former regarding the brain as an 

 instrument used by the mind in dealing with the external world, while 

 the latter conceives of brain-process as the physical basis or condition 

 of consciousness, which simply accompanies the brain-process without 

 exerting any influence upon it." One may argue with Huxley that 

 consciousness is an effect of the brain-process, or with Clifford that 

 the two processes are parallel, the brain being no more responsible for 

 consciousness than consciousness is for what happens in the brain. 



In the introduction Professor Strong effectively sets forth the re- 

 sults of the denial of casual relations which seems to be involved in 

 any of these views. "Parallelism involves the denial of the physical 

 efficiency of mind, and automatism the denial of its general efficiency." 

 "Thus a whole series of scientific and philosophical conceptions of the 

 first order — the principle of the conservation of energy, the mechan- 

 ical theory of life, the biological doctrine of evolution, the philosoph- 

 ical conceptions of mechanism, efficiency, free will — all converge and 

 come to a focus in the problem of the relation of mind and body. 

 Not only so, but every one of these conceptions is vitally engaged, 

 and will be found to stand or fall or suffer total transformation, accord- 

 ing as we espouse interactionism, automatism, or parallelism." 



We may reassure ourselves sotto 7Vce that the case is not so bad as 



