426 Jouriial of Comparative .Neurology and Psychology. 



is spiritual, the treasure-house must be the soul." It seems quite im- 

 possible for this writer to escape from the nave form of materialism in 

 his discussion. In spite of his explicit statement of the non-existence 

 of matter, he eveywhere sees it as assumed till he, by its destruction, 

 has proved his triumphant point. He says: "As there cannot be 

 motion without an object to move, so there cannot be thought without 

 a thinker." But this is a false analogy. The ''object" which moves 

 exists only as a judgment compounded of varieties of activities. So far 

 as physical science knows, the movements of an object is the moving 

 of other sorts of movement. In other words, we simply establish re- 

 lations between different orders of activities or energetic complexes. 



In the course of the chapter devoted to the possibility of "things- 

 in-themselves," after stating that no argument from analogy can possi- 

 bl\ prove the existence of things extra-mental, "The utmost it can 

 do is to indicate their nature, when their existence is known from some 

 other source," and "it is in the nature of the case, impossible that 

 consciousness should supply rational grounds for the inference of reali- 

 ties beyond itself." Dr. Strong goes on to state as a categorical and 

 "striking fact" that something to which neither the external nor 

 the internal senses lend the slightest testimony may yet with perfect 

 certainty be kowu to exist." It is to him a matter of surprise "that it 

 never occurred them (all other philosophers) that we might have a 

 kind of knowledge less rational than either, a kind founded on neither 

 reason nor experience, but solely on instinct. It never occurred to 

 them that neither experience nor reason can fully account for the 

 knowledge of other minds." How this is made to agree with a later 

 statement that "through our mental states, which alone are immediately 

 given, we may obttiin knowledge of non-empirical existences, as we 

 see in the case of other minds," we must leave to the author. 



A different point of view sometimes appears, as where it is said 

 "The reality of an object signifies its membership in an order in space 

 and time existing for all similarly organized percipients." 



As to Professor Strong's distinction between brain process and 

 mind process, the former a possibility of perception, the latter forever 

 beyond it (transcendent), it must be remembered that the distinction is 

 made in our own experience before it can be predicated of another. 

 So far as the mind process of another becomes knowledge it is inferred 

 in exactly the same way that brain process is, but we project the sub- 

 ject-object dualism of experience into another. 



As Dewey remarked in a recent lecture, "states of consciousness 

 have been made either a mythological monster eating up the whole of 



