42 8 Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology. 



being. The individuaiiziug character is //loJe. There is the widest 

 variety and there are compatibles and non-cornpatibles among modes. 

 There is for each unit (complex, energic center) a form peculiarly its 

 own to which there attaches an intrinsic as well as an extrinsic value 

 (action and reaction). The intrinsic value would be a "genetic mode" 

 incapable of being translated directly in terms of any other kind of be- 

 ing (but about which descriptions may be formulated in psychological 

 language). This is revealable directly only in itself but is the condi- 

 tion of the reflection of the external world into self. Such a mode is 

 every form of consciousness, instinct, affinity, habit, attraction (and 

 what-not unknown to us in the lower types of energic centres). There 

 is no such thing as a general consciousness, only various conscious 

 modes. The line between the conscious and unconscious in the in- 

 trin.«ic sphere is vague. In its earlier simpler form consciousness may be 

 but a longing, instinct, impulse or attraction. Each such genetic mode 

 is the intrinsic side of a definite kind or form of energy which is also 

 capable ©f becoming an object of observation extrinsically by influenc- 

 ing other energic centres. 



The real self in the case of man is not the sum of his conscious 

 acts at any one time or all times, nor of his bodily activities, but the 

 energic complex which, viewed intrinsically, forms the one, and 

 viewed extrinsically forms the other. The real self is the '-metaphys- 

 ical soul" referred to by Dr. Strong which is not only panpsychical 

 but panphysical. 



In this connection it is interesting to trace with Professor Bald- 

 win genetically the origin of ideas of mind and body. Assuming that 

 experience is at first protoplasmic or undifferentiated, the first distinc- 

 tions are of the "projective" order and do not give us self and not-self 

 as usually stated, but persons and things. Self is recognized later and 

 is divided into abody part and mind part. 



It is also important to consider that the "procedure which in- 

 volves treating other minds as objective phenomena, and at the same 

 time maintaining the psychic point of view with reference to one's own 

 mind is illegitimate." "The fallacy of the subjectivists is in saying 

 that in contrasting body and mind we may mean the thought of a body 

 which is a constructed object subject to analysis, and a thought of mind 

 which is not an object at all.'' (Of this fallacy the work entitled "Why 

 the Mind has a Body" is an illustration, as already pointed out.) 



The fallacy of the materialists, according to Professor Baldwin, 

 has its roots in "taking the spontaneous standpoint for one term of 



