Herrick, Body-Mind Controversy. 429 



the antithesis, body, and the reflective standpoint for the other, 

 mind." The nature of Professor Baldwin's answer to the question : 

 "How can body and mind, being what we have come to think them 

 to be, hve hospitably housed together in one phenomenal group of 

 facts ?" is only vaguely foreshadowed under the term, "Esthonomic 

 Idealism" and the "hope for a theory of correlation" is precisely what 

 inspires the dynamic realist in the energic postulate. 



We cordially assent to Dr. Alexander's criticism {Op. cit.) of 

 James' "stream of consciousness" which he wishes had never been in- 

 vented, for "It could hardly have arisen except in connection with a 

 parallelist, psychological view, and in metaphysics it is certainly harm- 

 ful." For the rest, the most important point in Alexander's article 

 is his discrimination of experience and consciousness. "Experience 

 means just the as yet unanalyzed and unclassified facts and happenings 

 encountered in the course of a natural human life." But this is not 

 the usual view ; it implies a soul other than the mind corresponding 

 to the "life" or complete being of the dynamic school, or, as Lotze 

 would say, "the life of a soul," coming into intelligibility in conscious- 

 ness. Consciousness is only an illumination of experience and it may 

 be a very partial illumination. The very appreciative allusion to Pro- 

 fessor Mach's view is interesting, for Mach, more than most writers, 

 solves the puzzle by denying its existence, stating that, in last resort, 

 the data of physics and of psychology are the same. But (inconse- 

 quently, as it seems to us) Professor Alexander seems to imply that 

 we have a means of knowing certain realities to be "wholly inanimate 

 and quite unconscious." 



Professor Bawden's earlier paper, "The Functional Theory of Par- 

 allelism," also quotes with approval Mach's view that "the boundary line 

 betAveen the physical and the psychical is solely practical and conven- 

 tional." "I see, therefore, no opposition of physical and psychical, 

 but simply identity. In the sensory sphere of my consciousness 

 everything is at once physical and psychical." Professor Bawden 

 considers that "the mental life is a continual synthetic construction. 

 It is simply the name for the orderly continuous functioning of an or- 

 ganism under conditions of tension in adaptation." "Mind is not an 

 entity behind the process of consciousness ; it is that process itself." 



In several places the materialistic view is verbally allowed, as 

 where the statement is made that "mind is here viewed as the totality 

 of the functioning matter." But "The psychical is the meaning of the 

 physical." "Consciousness represents what, comparatively, we may 

 call the tensional equilibrium of the organism, whereas habit represents 

 its relatively stable equilibrium." 



